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ABSTRACT
On December 22, Congress authorized the Flood Control Act of 1944, later
named the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program (PSMBP). The primary purpose of the
PSMBP, which would require the construction of six main stem dams on the Missouri
River, was to provide flood control, navigation, irrigation, and hydropower. The
Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara nations, the Three Affiliated Tribes, maintained a
reservation and way of life on Fort Berthold which lay in the direct path of the water that
would form the reservoir behind one of the dams, the Garrison Dam.
It is important to acknowledge that the Garrison Dam also affected many nonIndian farmers and communities, like those of Sanish and Van Hook. Their story and
desire for justice is worth inclusion and is an integral part of assessing the full impact of
the Garrison Dam upon all North Dakotans. For the sake of time and space their story
will be left for future scholarship.
This thesis explores the impact of the Garrison Dam on the Three Affiliated
Tribes located on the'Fort Berthold Indian Reservation in North Dakota. Congress
ignored both the concerns raised by the Tribes and the alternatives they suggested, and
the Tribes were forced to sacrifice their lands and way of life for what was termed “the
common good.” This is yet another chapter in the long history of troubled Indian policy.
A comparison of the experience of the Three Affiliated Tribes with that of other groups,
the Cherokee relocation in the 1830s for example, will suggest that despite over one
hundred years of experience, the American public and federal policy makers had learned
little.

viii

Legislative histories and transcriptions of congressional hearings provide policyrelated material. United States Army Corps of Engineers archives and Fort Berthold
tribal records reveal information related to the dam and reservoir. The intent of this study
is to record a neglected aspect of the government’s efforts to control the Missouri River.
I intend to show that the Garrison Dam was arguably one of the most destructive acts
perpetrated against an Indian tribe during the twentieth century. A pristine environment
was forever altered, and the damage caused by the Garrison Dam touched many aspects
of Indian life: social, political, and economic. Their environment was forever altered and
their story needs to be told.

IX

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: A PLACE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY

Environmental history is not confined to the study o f place or location, rather it
encompasses all aspects o f society and the “environment” in which it develops. It
involves the study o f the interconnectedness o f the relationships between humans and the
world around them. The American historian, Frederick Jackson Turner, defined western
development as a “process.” The history o f the process o f westward expansion must,
according to Turner, include not only the domination o f the land, but, as he said, “all the
economic, social and political changes which resulted.”1 It is the environment that
required man to change and in the process o f this change, he changed the environment
around him.
Turner viewed American expansion as a series o f conquests. He believed
interpretation o f these conquests could be understood by emphasizing the close
connection between the pioneers and the environment in which they lived.12 Many history
textbook authors have echoed this sentiment in the words they used to describe the
movement west by a young American nation.

1 W ilbur R. Jacobs, The F atal Confrontation: H istorical Studies o f American Indians, Environment, and
H istorians (A lbuquerque: U n iversity o f N e w M e x ic o Press, 1996), 138-139.
2 R ay A llen B illin gton , W estw ard Expansion: A H istory o f Am erican Frontiers, 4 lh ed (N e w York:
M acM illan P ub lish in g C o., 1974), xii.
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The development of environmental history and the attempts of environmental
historians serve to remind us that we are not the sole possessors of the earth. In
examining the alterations to the environment of the Three Affiliated Tribes by the
Garrison Dam, I will suggest the influence that environmental historians could have in
guiding the social and political thought processes that can either increase or decrease the
size of the human footprint on the earth. However, many historians and early history
textbook writers continued in the Tumerian fashion of portraying the earth as a
commodity while applauding our ingenuity to harness it.
Richard Hofstadter’s The American Republic echoed this “lordship” over the
environment in chapters titled, “Triumph of the Railroad” and “Oregon Settlement.”3 In
Hofstadter’s second volume of The American Republic, under the heading “Taming of
the West,” the West was portrayed as the “Land of Opportunity” and he wrote of the
conquest of the plains.4 Echoing Turner, Hofstadter reaffirmed the idea that European
settlers eventually conquered the New World wilderness, and during this long struggle,
the environment transformed the conqueror.5 What was absent in these discussions was
the ramifications of this process. Environmental historians remind us that development
may be necessary but there are always costs associated with it. The Mandan, Hidatsa,
and Arikara know well these costs. Society must ask itself whether the benefits are worth
the cost.

3 Richard Hofstadter, William Miller, and Daniel Aaron, The American Republic: Vol. One to 1865 (New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1959), x-xi.
4 Richard Hofstadter, William Miller, and Daniel Aaron, The American Republic: Vol. Two since 1865
(N ew Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1959), vii.

5 Ibid., 301.

3

Historian Walter Prescott Webb continued the trend of viewing the environment
as an object that required pioneers to hack their existence from out of the wilderness.
“For two centuries American Pioneers had been working out a technique for the
utilization of the humid regions east of the Mississippi River,” he wrote, “they found
solutions for their problems and were conquering the frontier at a steadily accelerating
rate.”6 The Great Plains were an obstacle that served to tax and often defeat man’s
ingenuity.

Nature’s very stubbornness drove man to make the innovations he did. The

new and old, innovations and survivals dwell side by side, the obverse and the converse
of the struggle between man and nature.
Historians Charles and Mary Beard touted the “exploitation of the land and
mineral resources” while conveying the harsh reality that land and resources had been
lost. “Grasslands were plowed up and turned into dust storms or over-grazed into deserts.
Forests were removed without regard to future growth, and magnificent trees by the
millions were lost.”7 Of the 1,400,000,000 acres of land within the continental U.S., only
186,000,000 acres remained in public possession in 1924, consisting mainly of
mountains, deserts, arid regions, and forest lands not suitable for cultivation. Much of the
Fort Berthold Indian Reservation with the exception of the rich river bottoms could be
described as such lands.
Samuel E. Morison and Henry Steele Commager wrote in The Growth o f the
American Republic that “the conquest of tne Great Plains, land that had for so long posed

6 Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plants: A Study in Institutions and Environment (Boston: Ginn and
Company, 1959), 8.
7 Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, A Basic History o f the United States (New York: Doubleday, Doran
and Co., 1944), 414-415.
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a formidable barrier to settlement, had been America’s most notable achievement.”8 The
disappearance of the frontier was due to the irresistible pressure of farmers, swarming by
the hundreds of thousands onto the High Plains and into the mountain valleys, subduing
this wilderness of prairie and mountain for cultivation and civilization. It was this
“frontier land,” declared Ray Allen Billington, where “pioneers and speculators vied for
nature’s bounties to fulfill the nation’s manifest destiny.”9
Historians of the American frontier have also often failed to acquaint their readers
with the utterly destructive impact that the fur trade and westward expansion had upon
the North American environment and on the American Indian.10* Even Turner in later
years concluded that pioneers “were wasteful and seeking quick results rather than
conservation and permanence.”11 Summing up the environmental impact of the
American frontier on the land by 1901, John Muir concluded “none of nature’s
landscapes are ugly so long as they are wild, but the continent’s beauty is fast passing
away, especially the plants of it, the destructible and most charming of all.” 12

8 Samuel E. Morison and Henry Steele Commager, The Growth o f the American Republic, Vol. Two (New
York: Oxford university Press, 1953), 75.
9 Ray Allen Billington, Bert J. Loewnberg and Samuel H. Brockunier, The United States: American
Democracy in World Perspective (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1947), 197.
10 For additional examples o f history textbooks containing domination and exploitation o f the environment
see Thomas A. Bailey, The American Pageant: A History o f the Republic. 3rd ed. (Lexington: DC Heath
and Company, 1966), John A. Garraty, The American Nature: A History o f the United States (New York:
Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1966), Margaret G. Mackey, Ernest W. Tiegs and Fay Adams. Your
Country's Story: Pioneers, Builders, Leaders. The Tiees-Adams Social Science Series. (Boston: Ginn and
Company, 1953).
" Turner quoted in Jacobs, The Fatal Confrontation, 5.

12 Muir quoted in Ibid., 22-23.
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It was fire, the axes, and “the destructive agency of browsing animals” that
destroyed forests and then prevented them from renewing themselves, wrote the historian
Francis Parkman.13 He likened a grazing sheep to a “hoofed locust.” Parkman was
protective of wilderness and among the first to teach that wilderness should be neither
feared nor destroyed. This part of America’s paradise was valuable in itself and for
society as a whole.
Like Parkman, environmental historians are concerned with protecting the
environment.1415 Environmental history deals with more than physical location or place, it
must assess the impact that the place or location has had upon society. The Garrison
Dam’s impact upon the Three Tribes provides another example of this concept as the
Indians sought continuation of agrarian lifeways facing the seemingly insurmountable
obstacle of Missouri River politics. The science of ecology deals with the interaction of
organisms with one another and with their physical surroundings.13
Biologist Rachel Carson stated that given time, time not in years but in millennia,
life adjusts, and a balance is reached. For time is the essential ingredient, but in the
modem world there is so little time.16 According to Aldo Leopold, founder of the
Wilderness Society, the merger of history with ecology is based on science, more
physical than spiritual. He espoused the idea of interdependency because the biotic

13 Quoted in Ibid., 124-125.
14 Oxford Encyclopedic Dictionary (1996), s.v. “environment” and “environmentalism.”
15 Ibid., s.v. “ecology.”
16 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co, 1994), 5-6.
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community is delicate, built upon intricate harmonies and balances.17 In 1789, Gilbert
White declared that ‘nature was a great economist,’ for she ‘converts the recreation of
one animal to the support of another!’18 He saw the emergence of ecology as a science
and ecology, almost inevitably, led to the idea of interdependence.
For Donald Worster, the principle goal of environmental history became one of
deepening our understanding of how humans have been affected by their natural
environment through time and, conversely, how they have affected that environment and
with what results.19 Historian James Malin called for a reexamination of the history of
the United States and by reading what ecologists wrote he knew how to ask the right
questions. “The ecological point of view,” he believed, “is valuable to the study of
history; not under any illusion that history may thus be converted into a science, but
merely as a way of looking at the subject matter and processes of history.”20 A synthesis
of history and ecology is essential because environmental history involves examining
change, voluntary or imposed, in subsistence methods and the ramifications for people
and the earth.
Aldo Leopold, “the Moses of the New Conservation impulse of the 1960s and
1970s,” according to intellectual historian Donald Fleming, “handed down the Tablets of
the Law...” His Sand County Almanac, believed Wallace Stegner, was a prophetic book,

17 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac: With Essays on Conservation from Round River (New York:
Ballantine Books, 1970), 258,260.
18 Donald Worster, Nature's Economy: A History o f Ecological Ideas (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), 7-9.
19 Donald Worster, ed., The Ends o f the Earth: Perspectives on Modern Environmental History (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 290.
20 Malin quoted in Ibid., 295.
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“the utterance of an American Isaiah.”21 For good reasons, Leopold who recognized that
humans were merely part of the whole is regarded as the most important proponent of
modem biocentric or holistic ethics.
Leopold called for a new “land ethic,” in which humans would be viewed as
members and citizens of the biotic community rather than as its conquerors. People, he
believed, should cease regarding responsible land use as only an economic issue. Rather
they should regard it in terms of what was ethically and esthetically right. An action was
right “when it tended to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic
community.” Otherwise it was wrong.2223
Land, according to this concept, is not merely soil; it is a source of energy flowing
through a circuit of soils, plants, and animals. Food chains are the complex living
channels that conduct energy upward; death and decay return it to the soil. Humans have
repeatedly through time disrupted this cycle, without assessing the full impact of their
actions.
Writing in the Atlantic Monthly in 1885, historian Francis Parkman criticized the
ignorance and greed of those who exploited America’s vast store of natural resources,
which they had done nothing to create, destroying the natural environment in the
process.

Roderick Frazier Nash, writing a century later, declared that an environmental

ethic would require that society exercise self-restraint when dealing with the natural

21 Stegner quoted in Ibid., 63.
22 Leopold. Sand County, 240-241.
23 Jacobs, Fatal Confrontation, 122.
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world.'4 Societies should not entertain the notion that nature and its resources existed
solely for their possession, use, and enjoyment. Unfortunately for the Three Tribes,
during the 1940s, the period of Garrison Dam, this will be a lesson yet to be learned by
society.
In essence, environmental history is the study of how people have interacted with
or perceived changes over time and valued the non-human world. It includes aspects of
esthetics and ethics, myth and folklore, science and religion, literature and landscape,
going wherever the human mind has grappled with the meaning of nature. Critical in
finding a place for environmental history is the acceptance of the relevancy of its
applications to the study of regions and the growth of societies. A brief assessment of the
human footprint upon the earth should help illustrate this relevancy.
William Cronon’s Changes in the Land explored how different ways of living
produced such different effects on the northern New England ecosystems. Europeans
sought to give their landscape a new purposefulness, often by simplifying its seemingly
chaotic tangle.

Indian communities had learned to exploit the seasonal diversity of their

environment by practicing mobility, relocating from place to place to find maximum
abundance through minimal work, reducing their permanent impact on the land. The
Europeans, however, believed in permanent settlement, therefore altering the landscape245

24 Roderick Frazier Nash, The Rights o f Nature: A History o f Environmental Ethics (Madison: University o f
Wisconsin Press, 1989), 10.
25 William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonies, and the Ecology’ o f New England (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1996), 12,33.
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permanently. Europeans considered the land as a commodity, and the pursuit of capital
and wealth is what set their societies apart from the pre-colonial Indians.26
Henry David Thoreau argued in 1854 that American society had lost touch with
its roots and was in danger of strangling the environment. In describing Walden Pond, he
wrote:
A lake is the landscape’s most beautiful and expressive feature. It is the earth’s
eye looking into which the beholder measures the depth of his own nature. The
fluviatile trees next to the shore are the slender eyelashes, which fringe it, and the
wooded hills and cliffs around are its overhanging brows.27
Walden Pond was Thoreau’s oasis from Boston’s hustle and bustle and the rigors
associated with a materialistic society. “Enjoy the land, but own it not,” he advised,
“Through want of enterprise and faith men are where they are, buying and selling, and
spending their lives like serfs.”28 Thoreau’s advice fell on deaf ears because the nation
was caught up in the midst of its westward migration. Even he could not ignore the pull,
however. “Eastward I go only by force;” he exclaimed, “ but westward I go free. I should
not lay so much stress on the fact if I did not believe that something like this is the
prevailing tendency of my countrymen. I must walk toward Oregon and that way the
nation is moving.”29 And move the nation did.
Richard White’s Land Use, Environment, and Social Change noted that in the
Pacific Northwest the old pattern was followed, a contrast between how Indians and non-

26 Ibid., 74-79.
27 Henry David Thoreau, 'Walden and Other Writings (1845). (New York: Barnes and Noble Books,
1993), 155.
28 Ibid., 173.
29

Ibid., 357.
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Indians altered the landscape. A common attitude of settlers was “to get the land subdued
and the whole wild nature out of it.”30 This mentality was typical and, unfortunately, the
ecological changes were lasting. The Salish Indians, in the region, utilized the land but,
like New England Indians, were careful to avoid abusing it. When the non-Indian settlers
arrived they brought with them the trappings of an extractive culture. Introduction of
foreign flora and fauna, such as thistles and sheep, permanently altered the landscape and
environment of Island County, Washington.31 During the 1850s and 1860s, logging in
the Pacific Northwest began in earnest. By the early twentieth-century the virgin forests
of Island County and the lands cherished by the Salish were nearly gone.
The Hardrock Mining Law of 1872, management of public rangeland and forestslands, development of hydroelectric power and dams, and the doctrine of extracting water
at no expense placed a heavy burden upon the environment. These “Lords of Yesterday,”
as environmental lawyer and historian Charles Wilkinson described them, lorded over the
environment and permitted the exploitation of a seemingly endless supply of natural
resources with little concern for long-term costs.32 Development of the Missouri was
one of the last significant projects to tame the wild rivers in the west.
Man’s arrogant belief that he can control nature was aptly demonstrated in 1975
when the Utah legislature passed a law declaring that the Great Salt Lake could not

j0 Richard White, Land Use, Environment, and Social Change: The Shaping o f Island Country, Washington
(Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 1995), 35.
31 Ibid., 77-93.
32 Charles F. Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian: Land, Water, and the Future o f the West
(Washington DC: Island Press, 1992), 20-23.
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exceed a level of 4020 feet. Almost ten years later, the lake put itself above the law by
reaching a level of 4206.15 feet.33
In 1987 the lake began to recede as multi-million dollar pumping stations were
placed into service to pump water into the desert to control the lake’s level. “We’ve
harnessed the lake!” exclaimed Utah’s Governor Norm Bangerter, “We are finally in
control.”34 But, at a cost. The Great Salt Lake was a refuge for millions of migrating
birds. Without such places, according to author Terry Tempest Williams, successful
migrations were endangered. In the case of the Great Salt Lake, conservation laws were
compromised and the American public averted its eyes.35 Yet another example of control
gone awry was the Mississippi Basin flood of 1927.
The Mississippi River swept across an area roughiy the size of Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont combined, leaving water as deep as thirty
feet on land stretching from Illinois to the Gulf of Mexico. John M. Barry’s book Rising
Tide recounts this often overlooked catastrophe and reminds Americans of how their
desire to control the Mississippi produced a disaster that changed the region’s
environment and ushered in New Deal programs seeking even more control of the
nation’s rivers.36

Terry Tempest Williams. Refuge: An Unnatural History o f Family and Place (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1991), 58.
34 Ibid., 247.
35 Ibid., 264-265.
36 John M. Barry, Rising Tide: The Great Mississippi Flood o f 1927 and How it Changed America (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 240.
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An environmentally conscious society, like environmental history, finally
blossomed during the 1960s and 1970s. It took the decline of the Peregrine Falcon and
images of the Native American, Iron Eyes Cody, weeping at the despoliation of a once
pristine landscape flashing across the nation’s television screens to influence Congress to
enact protective legislation. The process, however, was slow.
Thoreau viewed nature as a system of necessary, complex relationships that
cannot be disturbed in the slightest way without changing, perhaps destroying the
equilibrium of the whole. It was conceivable, even essential, Thoreau suggested, that all
men and women should “strive for a full measure of human dignity without severing their
natural roots or forgetting their place on the earth.”37 It took over 150 years, however, for
Americans to heed his call for a new environmental consciousness.
In her book Refuge, Terry Tempest Williams, discussed the shift of natural to
unnatural refuges in describing how urban wastelands were becoming wildlife’s last
stand. “The great frontier,” she wrote, “shifted and we’ve moved wildlife out of town
like all other low-income tenants.”38 Society has even sought to vilify portions of nature
such as the starling that, if anything is opportunistic in its behavior. “Perhaps we project
onto the starlings that which we deplore in ourselves: our numbers, our aggression, our
greed, and our cruelty. Like starlings, we are taking over the world.”39
Environmental historians, either as individuals or working within the framework
of such organizations as the American Historical Association and the Western Historical

37 Thoreau quoted in Worster, Nature's Economy, 111.
Williams, Refuge, 54.

39 Ibid., 56.
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Association, contribute to the movement by forging a balance between humans and
nature by focusing on the origins of the destruction of our environment.40 By revisiting
the past and retelling the story of westward expansion, for example, they can illuminate
the path towards sustainable development and equilibrium within the biotic community.41
In telling the story of the Three Affiliated Tribes I hope to remind readers of the costs
paid by sovereign people when the environment is assaulted by attempts to control the
natural world. Rachel Carson put it succinctly. The “control” of nature, she wrote
is a phrase conceived in arrogance, bom of the Neanderthal age of biology and
philosophy, when it was supposed that nature exists for the convenience of man.
The concepts and practices of applied entomology for the most part date from that
Stone Age of science. It is our alarming misfortune that so primitive a science has
armed itself with the most modem and terrible weapons, and that in turning
against the insects it has also turned them against the earth.42
Environmental history can be a means by which to acquire a clearer image of the
past and a sobering reappraisal of the generally accepted concept that unlimited growth,
frontier expansionism, and the wasteful use of non-renewable natural resources during
the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century was acceptable. This new field of
history is a chance to rediscover restraint and responsibility and the ancient awareness
that we are interdependent and connected with all of nature and that our sense of
community must take in the whole of it 43 It then becomes possible to see that we must
care for the planet.

40 Jacobs, Fatal Confrontations, 10.
41 Worster, Nature's Economy, 338.
42 Carson, Silent Spring, 296-297.
43 Worster, Ends o f the Earth, 20.
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In People o f the Valley, western writer Frank Waters wrote that rivers can be
dammed, but that the human spirit never can be.44 The present generation must make
wise choices to insure that the next can be sustained. “Today belongs to us,” said Oren
Lyons, an Onandaga Iroquois. “Tomorrow we’ll give it to the children, but today is ours.
You have the mandate,” he continued, “you have the responsibility. Take care of your
people, not yourselves, your people.”45

44 Frank Waters, People o f the Valley (Chicago: Sage Books, 1941).
45 Lyons quoted in Christopher Vecsey and Robert W, Venables, ed„ American Indian Environments:
Ecological Issues in Native American History (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 174.

CHAPTER TWO
FEDERAL POLICY AND INDIAN LAW: THE WINTERS DOCTRINE
Unlike land and forests, water resources were designated as common rather than private
property. Richard N.L. Andrews, professor o f environmental policy, University o f North
Carolina1
When I was a kid in geography class, I was taught that water flows downhill. What I’ve
learned since is that water flows to money and power, wherever that may be. Navajo
Tribal Chairmen Zak Peterson“
The tragedy of the past is that it set precedents for land theft today when there is no
longer any real need to steal such vast areas. But more damage is being done today by
the United States Government than was done in the last century. Water rights are being
trampled on. Land is being condemned for irrigation and reclamation projects. Indian
rights are being ground into dirt. Vine Deloria Jr
As the American people began to migrate towards the Pacific Ocean, during the
mid-1800s, continuation of this movement would ultimately hinge upon control and
availability of the most precious of western resources: water. Native American nations
had flourished in the arid and semi-arid lands west of the hundredth meridian. The new
invaders would require control of the water for their cities and farms. Conflict was most
likely inevitable.
In the West, Major John Wesley Powell, noted explorer and geologist,
consistently argued that land itself was almost worthless; it could only be made valuable123

1 Richard N.L. Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves: A HiJory o f American
Environmental Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 41.
2 Peterson quoted in Lloyd Burton, American Indian Water Rights and the Limits o f Law. (Lawrence:
University o f Kansas Press, 1991), ix.
3 Vine Deloria Jr., Custer Died fo r your Sins: An Indian Manifesto. (Norman: University o f Oklahoma
Press, 1989), 30.
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by water. Water rights were, therefore, more valuable than land titles, and should be tied
to each tract of land by law.4 The American Colossus was fiercely intent on
appropriating and exploiting the riches of arguably the richest of all continents, grasping
with both hands, reaping where he had not sown, wasting what he thought would last
forever. The man who could get his hands on the biggest slice of natural resources was
the best citizen.
The riparian doctrine permitted the diversion of water as long it did not interfere
with other users and the excess or unused portions were returned to the streams natural
state. This was the law under the riparian doctrine accepted by eastern states during the
colonial era.5 In the West a new law emerged. Water went to the first user. The oldest
water rights are absolutely superior to those of all junior users; senior users need not
share the resource. Under the pure prior appropriations doctrine, western water users
could, with impunity, flood deep canyons and literally dry up streams.6
In 1908 Winters v. United States, the Supreme Court declared that Indians
maintained riparian rights and that these rights were guaranteed through the many
agreements and treaties, even if not explicitly detailed, between the federal government
and the various Indian nations. This landmark decision has continued to influence the
policy of the United States regarding Indian water rights for the past ninety-two years.
This chapter will explore the history of Indian efforts in asserting these rights and
demonstrate that the Winters Doctrine will continue to be valid well into the next century.

4 Stuart Udall, The Quiet Crisis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winster, 1963), 90.
5 David H. Getches, Water Law: In a Nutshell. 3rd ed. (St.Paul: West Publishing Co., 1997), 18-20.
6 Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian, 21.
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However, every story must have a beginning and it is important to understand the early
water policies of a developing and expanding United States.
Riparian law viewed the watershed as an integral natural unit. Water was valued
as an amenity that added considerably to the worth and beauty of all parcels of land along
the watercourse. Prior appropriation rejected the riparian doctrine. The first users got a
guaranteed supply of water. There was no sharing of water. There was no need to
preserve water in a watercourse.7 The doctrine of prior appropriations was the keystone
of western water rights. It created the framework in which Indian-reserved rights
operated. Eventually every western state adopted water laws based in principle on the
doctrine of prior appropriations.
The West was semi-arid and the areas with the greatest need, cities, fertile
farmlands, mines, were usually located in close proximity to water sources.
Appropriation laws were well suited to meet the needs of farmers who depended on
irrigation. The “First in time, First in right” doctrine was amenable as well to aggressive
western cities which were spurred on by real estate interests wanting firm water rights for
their desired developments.

o

However, the Indians residing in the West also had a claim to the water and its
continued use was imperative for their continued existence as well. As the pressures of
Euro-American encroachment upon their lands increased, the federal government adopted
the policy of placing Indians in the West on reservations. By the 1890s all major Indian
nations from the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara to the Sioux and Navajo had been

' Charles F. Wilkinson, The Eagle Bird: Mapping a New West (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), 46.

8 Ibid., 48.
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relegated to life on government controlled reservations. Fifty percent of all the Indian
lands and seventy-five percent of the Indian reservation populations lay within the zone
of less than twenty inches of annual rainfall (the amount generally considered necessary
for successful agriculture), and as Indians sought to improve their condition through
economic development, the use of water for irrigation and for other uses became of
supreme importance. During the 1930s and 1940s the demand for water, from both
Indians and non-Indians, seemed bound to increase since the amount of water was strictly
limited. The problem of Indian water rights and government protection of them would be
a continuing one.9
Prior to 1904 all seventeen western states had developed comprehensive water
right statutes reflecting the appropriation doctrine. According to Winters, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs has a trustee’s responsibility to protect and conserve the Indian water
resources until the tribes themselves decide on a future course of action. Indian water
rights became a threat to state water rights. The uncertainty of the total scope of Indian
rights created a great uncertainty for state water administrators.10
The actions of the United States with respect to Indian-reserved water rights are
limited by its fiduciary duty as trustee to act for the benefit of the Indians. As a result,
the federal government must affirmatively assert and defend Indian water rights
However, during the 1940s as the Pick-Sloan plan was being developed for the Missouri,
the rights of the Three Tribes were never considered and largely ignored. In addition,

9 Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians. Vol. 2
(Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1995), 1179-1180, 1183.

19

unlike Federal reserved water rights, which the United States must manage in the public
interest, Indian rights may not be taken without the payment of just compensation.11
Hints of federally recognized Indian-reserved water rights could be traced as early
as the General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) passed on February 8, 1887. Section 7 stated:
That in cases where the use of water for irrigation is necessary to render the lands
within any Indian reservation available for agricultural purposes, the Secretary of
the Interior be, and he is, hereby, authorized to prescribe such rules and
regulations as he may deem necessary to secure a just and equal distribution
thereof among the Indians residing upon any such reservation; and no other
appropriation or grant of water by any riparian proprietor shall be authorized or
permitted to the damage of any other riparian proprietor.1012
Although the Dawes Act provided some credence to Indian-reserved water rights,
the Winters decision became the foundation for all future endeavors as Indians sought to
secure access to water.
Indians of the Fort Belknap reservation in northern Montana regularly complained
about off-reservation farmers and ranchers w'ho diverted water from the Milk River
before it could flow through their lands. Eventually their tribal government compelled
their agent into action. Superintendent William R. Logan complained to the
Commissioner of Indian affairs on June 3, 1905:
So far this spring, we have had no water in our ditch whatever. Our meadows are
now rapidly parching up. The Indians have planted large crops and a great deal of
grain. All will be lost unless some radical action is taken at once to make the
10 U.S. Department o f the Interior, Bureau o f Indian Affairs, Indian Water Rights: A Fact Book.
(Washington, D.C.: Department o f the Interior, 1978), 3-4. Thormosgard Law Library, University o f
North Dakota, Grand Forks.
11 Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, Reserved Water Rights for Federal and Indian
Reservations: A Growing Controversy in Need o f Resolution. (Washington, D.C.: United States GAO,
1978), 68. Thormosgard Law Library, University o f North Dakota, Grand Forks.
12 Francis Paul Prucha, ed., Documents o f United States Indian Policy (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska
Press, 1975), 174.
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settlers above the reservation respect our rights. To the Indian it means either
good crops this fall or starvation this winter.13
Logan’s complaint eventually brought the matter to court, where he pled his case
on the basis of prior appropriation. This doctrine, recognized by Montana, held that the
first users of water had the senior rights to the resource. Judge William Hunt of the
United States District Court decided that in agreeing to the terms of the 1888 treaty which
confined them to the lands of Fort Belknap, the Indians were entitled to sufficient water
to fulfill the purposes of that agreement. The treaty clearly indicated that the occupants
of the reservation should “become self-supporting as pastoral and agricultural people.” It
did not matter whether non-Indian farmers and ranchers such as Henry Winter (whose
name was erroneously entered as “Winters” in court documents) had a prior claim to the
water.14 After the Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Hunt’s decision, the United States
Supreme Court ruled on Winters v. United States on January 6, 1908.
Justice McKeena delivered the opinion of the Court:
The case, as we view it, turns on the agreement of May 1888, resulting in the
creation of Fort Belknap Reservation. By rule of interpretation of agreements and
treaties with the Indians, ambiguities occurring will be resolved from the
standpoint of the Indians. The Indians had command of the lands and the waters,
command of all their beneficial use, whether kept for hunting,, .or turned to
agriculture and the arts of civilization. Did they give up all this? Did they reduce
the area of their occupation and give up the waters that made it valuable or
adequate? ... If it were possible to believe affirmative answers, we might also
believe that the Indians were awed by the power of the Government or deceived
by its negotiators. The power of the Government to reserve the waters and
exempt them from appropriations under the state laws is not denied, and could not

13 Logan quoted in Peter Iverson, “ We Are Still Here American Indian in the Twentieth Century. The
American History Series. Ed. John Hope Franklin and A.S. Eisenstadt. (Wheeling: Harlen Davidson, Inc.,
1998), 40-41.

14 Ibid., 41.
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be. That the Government did reserve them we have decided, and for a use which
would be necessarily continued thorough years. Decree affirmed.15
The declaration of water rights for Fort Belknap, which became known as the
Winters Doctrine marked a fundamental turning point in the struggle of Indian people to
remain on their lands. Not only did Winters buttress Indian claims to water rights; it
offered additional testimony that Native people were not going to disappear. On Winters,
the Supreme Court agreed that (1) in keeping with the policies of western states’ water
rights, the date a reservation was established was to be considered the date water was
reserved (2) unlike state prior-appropriations doctrine, reserved rights were not liable to
extinction through non-use; and (3) right need not be quantified if the appropriated waters
are used to fulfill the reservation’s purposes.1617
Table 1. Comparison of the Winters and Prior Appropriations Doctrine17
Limit o f right
Applicable uses
Beneficial use
required?
State permit required?
Source o f ri^ht
Origin
Officially sanctioned
Principal beneficiaries

Winters Doctrine
Future need
Meet purpose o f reservation
No

Prior-Appropriations Doctrine
Present use
Defined by state laws
Yes

No
Reservation o f land
Federal courts
Federal courts
Indians on reservation

Yes
Diversion and use o f water
State courts, state laws
State & Federal courts/laws
Non-Indians

Dam and canal construction achieved its apex by the mid-1950s. Almost no
major watershed in the West was left untouched. Indian tribes had prior rights under the
reserved rights doctrine to significant quantities of the same water demanded by

15 Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) found in Monroe E. Price and Robert N. Clinton, Law and
the American Indian: Readings, Notes and Cases, (Charlottesville, VA: The Michee Co., 1983), 694-695.
16 Burton, American Indian Water Rights, 21.
17 Daniel McCool, Command o f the Water: Iron Triangles, Federal Water Development, and Indian Water
(Tucson: University o f Arizona Press, 1994), 45.
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reclamation projects, but the delivery and storage systems built by both the United States
Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) and US Army Corps of Engineers were for the benefit,
almost exclusively, of non-Indians. In the case of the Pick-Sloan plan, the six main-stem
dams conspicuously flooded more Indian than non-Indian lands and the affected
reservations were unable to mount an effective defense against these plans. The BIA
supported and the Department of Interior pushed for Missouri basin development. A
classic case on conflict of interest ensued.
From the 1920s through the 1960s, reservoir capacity in the West mushroomed,
expanding at the rate of nearly 80% per decade. The dams of the Colorado River
watershed held back 72 million acre-feet of water in storage, nearly six times the annual
flow of the river while Missouri River impoundment’s dammed up 85 million acre-feet.
In the Pacific Northwest, reservoirs captured 55 million acre-feet; in California, the figure
was 39 million acre-feet. Westwide, more than a million artificial reservoirs, lakes, and
ponds stored more than 294 million acre-feet, enough to put Montana, Wyoming,
Colorado, and New Mexico, under a foot of water.18 The most extensive impacts have
involved Native Americans, whose established water rights have been expropriated in
every comer of the American West. Along the upper Missouri tribes the loss of land was
substantial. Fort Berthold lost 155,000 acres, the Sioux of Lower Brule, Cheyenne
River, and Standing Rock an additional 260,000 acres. In the Pacific Northwest
developments along the Columbia eradicated native fisheries and sacred locations such as
Celilo Falls.

18 Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian , 259-267.
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The Winters doctrine has provided few benefits to the tribes. Winters was
common knowledge, but it was ignored, subverted, and circumvented. Taking the cue,
state officials effectively read Winters out of existence through a business-as-usual
approach of granting state water rights and allowing diversions that directly conflicted
with Indian rights.19
Indian tribes did not and would not cease to assert their claims and several
supporting court decisions would be delivered beginning in the 1920s. In 1921, the Ninth
Circuit held in Skeen v. United States (273 F. 93, 9th Cir 1921), that the Winters rights
were not limited to use on those lands under present cultivation on an Indian reservation
but could be expanded to include the entire land holdings of a tribe. This decision also
supported the ability of a tribe to lease its Winters rights in conjunction with the lease of
tribal lands.20
In United States v. Powers (305 U.S. 527, 1939), the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the Winters doctrine and found an implied reservation for allotted lands without defining
the extent or precise nature of the right to water. In the same year, the decision handed
down in United States v. Walker River Irrigation Project (104 F.2d 334, 9lh Cir. 1939),
established that Indian-reserved water rights could be created, even if not expressly
asserted, by Executive order as well as by treaty or agreement, putting most tribes on
equal footing regarding the validity of water rights claims.

Despite these declared

victories, the tribes could do little to prevent the federal government’s and the American

19 ibid., 268.
20 Burton, American Indian Water Rights, 23.

21 Ibid., 25.
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public’s desire to seize control of the waters in the West. During the 1930s era of largescale water development, nearly every major western river and tributary was dammed.
Another federal nail in Indian water rights was the McCarran Amendment [43
U.S.C. 666 (1952)] which allowed state courts to adjudicate federal water rights acquired
under state law. Although there is no mention of reserved rights or Indian water rights
the implications of state adjudication would prove a setback for Indian sovereignty as
well as their ability to assert their water rights. The 1952 McCarran amendment waived
the government’s immunity from suit where “the United States is the owner of.. .water
rights.” The waiver was later held by the Supreme Court to apply to Indian reserved
rights as well as to all federal water rights.22 As will be seen in the San Carlos decision,
the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the amendment holding that the Congress
intended to include Indian water rights.23 The impact of this out come led many tribes to
seek settlements outside the court rather than subject themselves to state court
adjudication.
During the Eisenhower administration the only major Indian water-rights case
decision was United States v. Ahntanum Irrigation District (236 F.2d 321, 9th Cir. 1956),
in which the Ninth Circuit restated and enlarged upon its findings pointing out once more
that the federally reserved water rights of tribes need not be fixed in quantity but may
expand with the needs of the tribe. Subsequently the US Supreme Court denied an
immediate appeal regarding the Ninth Circuit’s decision [cert. Denied 352 U.S. 988

22 Getches, Water Law, 14.
2j John R. Wunder, ed. Recent Legal Issues for American Indians, 1968 to the Present (New York:
Garland Publishing, Inc., 1996), 124.
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(1957)].24 The court rejected any notion that the amount of water reserved to an Indian
Reservation was to be measured by the Indian’s needs at the time the reservation was
created.
Water rights of Indians were a vital issue as Indians sought continued economic
development of their reservations, and the basic document of Indian water rights
remained the 1908 Winters decision. However, the specter of quantification, no matter
how often rejected, would emerge to plague Indian efforts of prosperity and selfdetermination. The Three Affiliated Tribes would be no exception.
In regard to the critical issue of water rights, one example of how the federal
government maintained the tradition of failing to abide by its own laws is the treatment of
the Sioux and Three Affiliated Tribes on the Missouri. The federal agencies involved in
the Pick-Sloan program have never acknowledged the legal provisions of the Winters
Doctrine. Though their dams destroyed more Indian land than any previous public
works, the Pick-Sloan administrators seemed not to have given more than an after
thought to the tribes of the Missouri Basin.
Winters was reaffirmed in 1963 in a most difficult context, the long-standing
struggle among Arizona, California, and five other western states over the rights to the
Colorado River in the parched Southwest. At the center of the struggle were the five
Indian reservations of Chemehuevi, Cocopah, Yuma, Colorado River and Fort Mohave
on whose behalf the federal government had asserted their rights to the water of the
Colorado. Justice Black delivered the opinion:

24 Burton, American Indian Water Rights, 28.
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The Masters found as a matter of fact and law that when the United States created
these reservations or added to them, it reserved not only land but also the use of
enough water from the Colorado to irrigate the irrigable portions of the reserved
lands. The Court in Winters concluded that the Government when it created that
Indian Reservation, intended to deal fairly with the Indians by reserving for them
the waters without which their lands would have been useless. We follow it now
and agree that the United States did reserve the water right for the Indians
effective as of the time the Indian Reservations were created. We also agree with
the Master’s conclusion as to the quantity of water intended to be reserved. He
found that the water was intended to satisfy the future as well as the present needs
of the Indian Reservations and ruled that enough water was reserved to irrigate all
the practicably irrigable acreage on the reservations. [Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546 (1963)]25
Reserved rights attach to reservations, whether or not the instruments creating
them mention water rights. In both cases, Winters and Arizona, the Supreme Court held
that an implied reservation of water rights was made at the time the Indian reservations
were created. In Arizona, the reserved water rights of Indians were expanded to include
sufficient water for future needs and were not limited to those needs that prevailed at the
time the reservation was established. The quantification issue was now addressed and the
“practicably irrigable acreage” (PIA) standard would be an effective tool for tribes to
assert their rights.
Since the Winters decision, Indian water rights had existed primarily on paper
rather than in acre-feet, the amount of water needed to cover an acre of ground with an
inch of water, or 326,000 gallons. The decision of the Supreme Court in 1963 in Arizona,
indicated the future might hold more promise for the realization of those rights. In
Arizona the Court concluded that Indian reservations on the lower Colorado River should
receive almost one million acre-feet of water per year. The decision eventually expedited

25
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the delivery of water not only to these particular tribes but potentially to other groups in
the Southwest as well.26
The United States and Indian tribes vigorously resisted the inclusion of reserved
rights under the terms of the McCarran Amendment. First, the Amendment applied only
to water rights acquired under state law. Second, even if it did apply to reserved rights, it
did not apply to Indians. Indian rights were essentially privately owned property rights
the United States held in trust for the tribes, not water rights “owned” by the US
government. Finally, even if applicable in states with enabling acts that do not disclaim
jurisdiction (Colorado), it couldn’t apply in states with express disclaimers of jurisdiction
over Indian lands.27 Application of reserved water rights, by Indians, did not always
meet with success as both federal and state agencies continued to ignore Winters and
Arizona.
In 1967, the Bureau of Reclamation established the Yellowstone sub-basin
without regard to Indian water rights. At that time the Bureau sold the “surplus” water of
the Wind, Big Horn, and Yellowstone Rivers to twelve of the nation’s largest energy
corporations. The Wind River Indians in Wyoming and the Crow and Northern
Cheyenne tribes in Montana tribes were left with virtually no water for their own future
development, despite the supposed superiority of their legal claim.

At took over thirty

years for the Interior Department to acknowledge the Winters Doctrine or Arizona to
quantify tribal needs and to compensate the Indians for the loss of their water rights.

26 Iverson, “We Are Still Here ", 169.
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Another example of neglect occurred on November 29, 1967. The Crow nation
requested 250,000 acre-feet per year from the Yellowtail Reservoir for use in coal
development. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) supported the tribe’s request. The US
Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) determined, however, that only 110,000 acre-feet of the
640,000 acre-feet of water available for industrial purposes could be reserved for tribal
development of coal land. The BIA, desiring to avoid lengthy adjudication, agreed to the
amount and it was officially accepted. In October 1968, the Bureau of Reclamation
reported the reservoir now produced 775,000 acre-feet of water per year for industrial
use, however, it did not increase allocations to the Crow nation.282930 The Indians came last
in any determination of water allocations made by the USBR.
In 1973 the National Water Commission issued their findings on the
government’s efforts to protect and assert Indian water rights. The report stated:
Many large irrigation projects were constructed on streams that flowed through or
bordered Indian Reservations. Sometimes above and more often below the
Reservations. With few exceptions the projects were planned and built by the
federal government without any attempt to define, let alone, protect prior rights
that Indian tribes might have had in the waters used for the projects. In the
history of the United States government’s treatment of Indian tribes, its failure to
protect Indian water rights for use on the Reservations it set aside for them is one
of the sorrier chapters.
For Indian-reserved rights, the Commission recommended that such rights be
inventoried and quantified. The implications could mean that tribes with water rights
quantified in acre-feet could own or control most of the waters impounded by western

28 Micahel Lawson and Vine Deloria Jr., Dammed Indians: The Pick-Sloan Plan and the Missorui River
Sioux. 1944-1980 (Norman: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1994), 191-192.
29 Richard L. Berkman and W. Kips Viscusi, Damming the West: Ralph Nadar's Study Group Report on
the Bureau o f Reclamation (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973), 180-181.
30 1973 Water Commission Report quoted in Wilkinson, The Eagle Bird, 52.
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reservoirs. The politics of such a decision could radically alter the distribution of water
in the West to the economic benefit of the affected tribes. In the case of the Three
Affiliated Tribes quantification could mean ownership of Lake Sakakawea.
A 1975 Department of Interior study identified a key issue as yet not clearly
resolved by the courts; since the purpose of the Indian reservation was to provide an
economic base for the Indian people residing therein, it must follow that Indian water
rights were a right to use the available reservation water for any beneficial use including
irrigation, livestock, domestic, power, recreation, industrial, and municipal purpose, and
the maintenance of instream flows to protect biotic and aesthetic values inherent in
reservation and related systems.31 The basic problem remains that the agency charged to
protect the interest of the Indians continued to look to the courts to accomplish this
purpose when the Congress should have intervened on the tribes behalf as required by the
long standing trust relationship between the federal and tribal governments. Congress
had been remiss to assert itself on this regard and was guilty of failing to fulfdl its
fiduciary responsibilities to the Indian people. The answer does not lie in the state or
federal courts. It lies within the plenary power [Lonewolf v. Hitchock, 187 U.S. 553,
(1903)] possessed by a Congress that seems reluctant to exercise it. If Congress and the
Executive Branch would clarify the tribal water rights, courts would not have to weigh
each case after a problem occurs.
In 1976, the Supreme Court ruled that since the United States held title to Indianreserved water rights in trust for the benefit of the Indians, the United States was the
owner of the Indian-reserved rights within the meaning of the McCarran Amendment

31 Comptroller General, Reserved Water Rights, 20.
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[Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) reh,
den., 426 U.S. 912 (1976)].32 Now both State and Federal courts had concurrent
jurisdiction to adjudicate Indian and Federal reserved water rights. In the absence of
congressional legislation, Native Americans have gone to court to assert their rights.
This has led to 1) large-scale settlements and 2) a series of state-tribal-federal negotiated
settlements.
Even though many Indian tribes did not know how much water they would need,
tribes have not uniformly supported the concept of a final quantification of their reserved
water rights, which the states have continued to favor. A typical declaration of this
purpose by the states is evident in a letter, from then Attorney General for Washington
State, Slade Gorton:
As to long dormant federal impliedly reserved rights held for Indians, the Indians
should be provided a reasonable time period to exercise these dormant rights and,
after the running of that period, all such rights still remaining dormant should be
extinguished and the Indian beneficiaries compensated in the amount, if any,
required by the US Constitution (Letter from Slade Gorton to Henry Eshwege,
GAO, July 18, 1978).33
Two prominent national Indian organizations the National Congress of American
Indians (NCAI) and the National Tribal Chairmen’s Association (NTCA), expressed
opposition to quantification in a their joint statements issued in 1976 to Assistant
Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs. They stated:
Quantification of Indian Winters Rights is neither necessary nor desirable at this
time. A final determination, made at any given date, is inconsistent with the

32 Ibid., 68.
33

Ibid., 82-83.
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open-endedness of the right itseif (Letter to Henry Eshwege, GAO, July 10,
1978).54
The NCAI also recommended in their letter that the States and non-Indians be
challenged to place a ceiling on their own water use, rather than calling for Indians to
place a ceiling upon their water rights. They also called for the termination of federal
subsidies to all non-Indian water development in the West. Both the NCAI and NTCA
asserted that Indians must be allowed to participate in the planning and decision-making
process for their watershed.33
Congress continued to ignore the rights of Indians and their rights were played out
in the courts instead. In 1978, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) Justice
Rehnquist writing for the majority declared that:
While many of the contours of what has come to be called the ‘impliedreservation-of-waters-doctrine’ remains unspecified, the Court has repeatedly
emphasized that Congress reserved “only that amount of water necessary to fulfill
the purpose of the reservation,” no more.*3536
The implications of this decision were that Indian-reserved water rights continued
to reside in the idea of the “specific purpose for which the land was reserved,”
determination of which has yet to be clearly defined and remains clouded to this day. In
1979, the state water engineers for New Mexico stated, “Historically, Congress forgot to
address the issue [of Indian water rights]. Today the potato’s gotten so hot Congress
wouldn’t touch it with a ten-foot pole.”37 Since the Congress was reluctant to resolve the
issue, the tribes would assume the initiative to avoid state court adjudication and obtain

j4 Letter from the NCAI to Henry Eshwege, July 10, 1978 quoted in Ibid., 104-105.
35 Ibid.
36 Price, Law and the American Indian, 700-701.
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settlements themselves from the States. In effect, they were exercising their inherent
sovereignty.
Congress has continued to play its more limited role of ratifying individual largescale agreements involving the disposition of Indian water resources. Measures such as
the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project Act, the Ak-Chin and Papago groundwater settlement
agreements, and the Mission, Ute, and Pima settlement were bargains ratified or
authorized by Congress and were all situations in which the tribes agreed to limit or defer
Winters rights in return for guaranteed water delivery.3738
Negotiation, rather than litigation, has emerged as the principal vehicle for
assertion and substantiation of Indian water rights. Typical of many deals was the
Southern Arizona Rights Settlement Act (SARSA) which settled the long-standing claims
of the San Xavier Reservation and Schuk Toak District (Oct 1982; P.Law 97-293). The
act provided a total of 76,000 acre-feet of water, including 27,000 acre-feet of Central
Arizona Project water for San Xavier. The act also provided $15 million in trust funds;
interest and dividends could be spent for subjugation of land, development of water
resources, construction, operation, and maintenance of on-reservation facilities.39
Native Americans did not always gain something; perhaps the worst setback for
Indian-reserved rights involved tribal attempts to reopen or expand upon court decisions
quantifying their rights. In Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983), the Court
rejected an attempt by the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe to litigate its claim for water to

37 McCool, Command o f the Water, 61.
Burton, American Indian Water Rights, 59.
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satisfy the purpose of setting aside the reservation as a fishery.*
40 Similarly, reopening of
Arizona v. California, [460 U.S. 605 (1983)] the five Colorado river tribes were denied
the opportunity to present evidence on various irrigable lands that had been omitted from
the governments claim because of neglect, mistakes by federal attorneys, or because the
reservation boundaries had not been finally determined at the time of the original 1963
decision. Although not a major setback, during this period of settlements it seemed
unlikely that the tribes would be successful in recovering from old wounds and mitigated
rights.
Since 1982, Congress has approved fourteen settlement agreements to resolve the
reserved water rights claims of several Indian tribes. Each of the agreements contained
four common elements:
1. Federal investment in water development facilities without impairing established
non-Indian uses
2. Significant non-federal cost sharing
3. Creation of substantial Indian trust funds used by tribes to develop their water and
for other purposes
4. Limited off-reservation water marketing to gain economic benefits.41
The tribes have taken it upon themselves to overcome congressional hurdles and quite
effectively asserted their rights and achieved guaranteed levels of support. The following
table illustrates the extent and volume of the cost and acre-feet of water associated with
these agreements.

Thomas R. McGuire and William B. Lord and Mary G. Wallace, eds., Indian Water in the New West
(Tucson: University o f Arizona Press, 1993), 42.
40 Getches, Water Law, 16.
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Table 2. Summary of Enacted Western Indian Water Claims Settlements'1'
Settlement
San Carlos
Jicarilla Apache
Northern Cheyenne
Fort Hall
Fort McDowell
San Luis Rey
Salt River Pima-Maricopa
Colorado Ute
Fort Peck
Tohono G ’odham
Ak-Chin
Utah Ute
Navajo

Year o f Settlement
1992
1992
1992
1990
1990
1988
1988
1988
1985
1982
1978, 1984
1965,1992
1962

Quantity o f Water
(Acre-feet)
150,000
32,000
91,300
130,000
36,400
16,000
122,000
119,300
1,000,000
66,000
85,000
- -

508,000

Estimated Total Federal
Cost (millions o f S)
38.4
6.0
56.5
22.0
66.0
32.0
60.0
184.0
0
143.0
93.0
198.5
602.0

Citing congressional intent in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, [103 S.Ct
3201 (1983), revd. and remanded] the Court held that state courts were the preferred
forum in which to adjudicate Indian water rights, and it indicated that the McCarran
Amendment waived the sovereign immunity of the Indian tribes.4243 The Court concluded
that concurrent jurisdiction existed in regards to both Indian and non-Indian water claims
but gave preference to state court proceedings. The basis for their decision was not
founded upon constitutional grounds nor even the [McCarran] amendment itself, but as
Justice Brennan wrote, on consideration of “wise judicial administration giving regard to
conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.”44 In
effect the Court reversed the previous policy of allowing Indian property rights to be
adjudicated only in federal courts, and did it primarily on grounds of judicial efficiency.
When viewed in the context of previous Court holdings in cases involving the

42 From McGuire, Indian Water, 29.
43 Vine Deloria Jr., ed. American Indian Policy in the Twentieth Century>(Norman: University o f
Oklahoma Press, 1985), 198.
44 Supreme Court Justice Brennan quoted in Ibid., 203.

35

adjudication oflndian rights and Indian tribal sovereignty, it is clear that the San Carlos
case broke a long tradition of leaving the tribes free from state jurisdiction.
The issue of quantification and use of water continued to be played out in the
courts as states and Indian tribes reached impasses towards equitable settlements such as
those in the table above. In Wyoming v. United States [492 U.S. 406 (1989), the state
petitioned for certiorari, attempting to get the Court to find that the application of the
PIA standard was unfair and improper under the circumstances of the case. The Tribes
claimed denial of the right to water for energy development, and objected to being held to
a standard of irrigation efficiency in future water development more rigorous than applied
to non-Indians. The Supreme Court only heard the state’s case regarding the “PIA”
standard, ignoring the Indian claims altogether.4546 The decision in Wyoming confirmed
state court quantification of Indian reserved water rights and reaffirmed the general
principle of reserved rights traceable to Winters and Arizona I. This judicial doctrine
seems sealed by congressional acquiescence.
Most of the twentieth century passed without the tribes being able to enjoy the full
benefits of the Winters Doctrine and thus without unduly upsetting the established uses of
non-Indians or even preventing new uses. Water has become a symbol to Indians in their
determination to remain Indian and preserve their traditional homelands and sovereignty.
By helping Indians obtain water the government can assuage some of the bitterness
caused by past injustices.40

45 Getches, Water Law, 17.
46 McCool, Command o f the Water, 254.
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In the absence of congressional action, the Justice Department was saddled with
the nearly impossible and ethically questionable mission of representing both sides, the
Indians and the Bureau of Reclamation. In sum, bureaucratic implementation of Indian
water rights was a confused and contradictory process with unclear goals, unclear lines of
authority, and inequality in relative bureaucratic resources.47 Probably the most
significant institutional barrier-blocking fulfillment of Indian water rights concerns the
structure of the Department of the Interior. The Bureaus of Reclamation and Indian
Affairs are both within the same department, so conflicts between the two were often
resolved in behind-the-scenes political bargaining.48
Despite the apparent setbacks of San Carlos and Arizona II, there appears within
the Supreme Court a return to recognition of Indian-reserved water rights. The McCarran
Amendment waived the sovereign immunity of the United States to permit states to join
the federal government in a suit to determine the water rights of users of a river system in
stream adjudication. In 1976, the US Supreme Court held that federal water rights
reserved for Indian tribes could be adjudicated in state courts.49 The 1983 San Carlos
decision extended the waiver of sovereign immunity to states that had disclaimed
jurisdiction over Indian lands as a condition of statehood.50 The Supreme Court,
however, in the case of United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct 1011 (1992),
significantly redirected a historical tendency towards liberal construction of waivers of

47 Ibid., 62
48 Berkman, Damming the West, 193.
49 See Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
50 This included the states o f Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Oklahoma, Utah, Wyoming, and Washington.
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sovereign immunity, stating (1) that the McCarran Amendment should never have been
interpreted to permit adjudication of Indian water rights in state courts, and (2) that
opponents of state adjudication of Indian water rights have new, legal support from the
Court, itself, in Nordic Village, for asserting that Indian water rights should be exempt
from state court adjudication under the McCarran Amendment and (3) that Indian rights
should be adjudicated and defended in the more hospitable environment of federal
courts.51
Since the 1700s the government made treaties that promised Indians that the
remnants of their traditional lands and reservations could not be taken from them,
including the water that gave them life.52 The government also encouraged millions of
settlers to move west to take up residence, while the states clearly sanctioned their water
rights. Herein lies the paradox of western water law since the solution that confiscates
water from non-Indians in order to meet the government’s obligation to Indians would
simply create a new set of victims.33
The Winters Doctrine after over ninety years of application, hundreds of law review articles, and thousands of court cases, still abounded with unanswered questions.
The great value of the Winters Doctrine to Indians today remains its open-endedness. It
is so vague that a nearly limitless variety of claims can be filed under it. That sense of
uncertainty may well prove to be the tribe’s greatest weapon in the twenty-first century.

51 S.M. Feldman, “The Supreme Court’s New Sovereign Immunity Doctrine and the McCarran
Amendment: Towards Ending State Adjudication o f Indian Water Rights,” Han’ard Environmental Law
Review 18 (1994): 433-488.
52 From the Trade and Intercourse Laws o f the 1700s to the last treaties o f the late 1800s, Indians were
consistently promised fair treatment and a viable land base.
x> McCool, Command o f the Water, 254.
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By the 1940s, the Missouri River Basin was the last bastion of a major freeflowing western river. Following the disastrous floods of 1943 the public cried out for
control of the river known as the “big muddy.” The Flood Control Act of 1944 called for
319 projects, including 112 dams throughout the basin, yet the eleven Indian tribes of the
upper Missouri, all poor, all suffering from massive unemployment, would receive almost
nothing from the plans’ implementation. The Three Affiliated tribes of the Fort Berthold
reservation, promised occupation of their lands in perpetuity by the federal government in
Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851, would see their land and water rights denied and subjugated
by developers and downstream concerns.

CHAPTER THREE
FLOODED DREAMS: PICK-SLOAN AND THE COMING OF GARRISON DAM

The Missouri River was an enigma. Despite over a century of human attempts to
understand and control it, America’s longest waterway remained a perplexing and
mysterious entity until the mid-twentieth century. As the principal tributary of the
Mississippi, the Missouri at 2,464 miles is the longest river in North America (the
Mississippi by comparison is 2,350 miles long). Flowing out of the Rocky Mountains
and across the Great Plains, the Missouri joins the Mississippi just north of St. Louis
draining a basin of more than 528,000 square miles. The Central Plains section through
which the Missouri flows is one of great climatic instability. Although amounts much
higher and much lower occur, the average annual precipitation is about 15 inches.1
Before the coming of the white settlers, short grasses covered the upland surfaces, while
the green foliage of deciduous trees marked the courses of the streams hidden below the
level of the plains.12
The Missouri River valleys were elongated oases with environmental conditions
conducive to agriculture. Before the dams, the river meandered back and forth across the
flood plains from 200 to more than 400 feet below the adjacent upland plains. The

1 Howard Lamar, ed., The New Encyclopedia o f the American West (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1998), 723.

2

Additional information on the Missouri basin can be located in the following works: Richard G.
Baumhoff, The Dammed Missouri Valley: One-sixth o f Oar Nation. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951)
and Stanley Vestal, The Missouri (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1964).
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Indians farmed the rich alluvial soil and cleared the densely wooded areas of
cottonwoods and willows for timber and shelter.3
The Missouri River bottom was a garden spot in a forbidding country and it was
here in 1862, near the modem day city of Bismarck, North Dakota, that the Arikara
joined the Mandan and Hidatsa who had been living along the Missouri since the mid1700s 4 Here in these valleys they flourished as bankers and traders with their villages
serving as the principal way stations along the river. Their valley homes abounded with
game and provided shelter in the substantial forests that grew along the river margin.
Along the lower slopes of these deep valleys were perennial springs. The valley had
fertile land for fanning, wild fruits, and river access for fishing. (Figure 1) The hillsides
provided lignite for fuel. There was grass, water, and shelter all that the Three Tribes
required.5
The Three Tribes67were not completely sedentary and ventured up onto the plains
to hunt buffalo and other game. It was the valleys, however, that provided the bulk of
their sustenance. There they grew varieties of beans, numerous types of squash, flint
com, dent com, sweet com and many other garden crops. They bred these vegetable
species to survive the cold springs and short summers of northern latitudes. Despite

3 Roy W. Meyer, The Village Indians o f the Upper Missouri: The Mandans, Hidatsas, and Arikaras
(Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1977), 1.
4 Ibid., 42.
3 Arthur E. Morgan, Dams and other Disasters: A Century o f the Army Corps o f Engineers in Civil Works
(Boston: Porter Sargant Publisher, 1971), 41.
6 The Three Affiliated Tribes, the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara will henceforth be referred to as the Three
Tribes.
7 Ibid., 42.

41

pandemics and predation by their aggressive neighbors, principally the Lakota Sioux, the
Three Tribes would maintain their valley homes for hundreds of years.s

Fort Berthold and Like-a-Fishhook village: painting by Philippe Regis de Trobriand (ca. 1868). Courtesy o f the State Historical

Society o f North Dakota

Figure 1. A View of Missouri Bottomlands Below Fort Berthold ca. 18689

This chapter is the story of the Missouri and the nations desire to control and
harness its power at the expense of the environment and Three Affiliated Tribes on the
Fort Berthold Indian Reservation in North Dakota. It is a story of a people whose dream
was to remain upon their lands to continue their journey towards prosperity and self-*

g

For a general history o f the Three Affiliated Tribes consult the following works: Edwin Thompson
Denig, Five Indian Tribes o f the Upper Missouri: Sioux, Arickaras, Assiniboines, Crees and Crows. Edited
by John C. Ewers (Norman: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1973), Mary Jane Schneider, North Dakota
Indians: An Introduction, 2"d ed. (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1994), Adrian R. Dunn, “A History
o f Old Fort Berthold.” North Dakota History 30 (Winter 1963): 157-240, and Ralph M. Shane, “A Short
History o f the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, " North Dakota History 26 (Fall 1959): 120-140.
9 Meyer, Village Indians, 212.

42

sufficiency. The dreams of the Three Tribes to exist within the larger culture while
maintaining their rich heritage were subjugated for the dreams of developers, lowerMissouri basin states and the US Army Corps’ desire to control a river.
In the September 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie, the US government in exchange
for vast areas of traditional domain, made solemn promises that the Three Tribe’s choice
homeland the river valley, as well as additional uplands in all some 12.5 million acres,
should be theirs in perpetuity along with goods, services, and money.101 It was during this
time that the government began to recognize the three separate tribes as a single political
entity. This treaty was not a generous gift from the government, but the purchase price
for an ancestral domain.11
Although the Three Tribes never occupied much of the original 12.5 million acres
allotted them by the original treaty, in accordance with federal Indian policies current at
various times since 1851, reservation acreage was substantially reduced.12 Often these
reductions occurred without the knowledge and consent of the Indians. The first
reduction occurred on April 12, 1870, when the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation was
formally created by an executive order. In 1880 the reservation was reduced again to
around 3 million acres by another executive order to provide land for railroad

10 Ray H. Mattison, ed., “North Dakota History,” Journal o f the Northern Plains 35, no. 3 &4 (1968): 229232.
11 Early contact with Europeans and Americans is available in the following: George Catlin, Letters anti
Notes on the North American Indians. Edited by Michael M. Mooney (New York: Gramery Books, 1975),
Bernard DeVoto, ed, The Journals o f Lewis and Clark (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), and Davis
Thomas and Karin Ronnefeldt, ed., People o f the First Man: Life Among the Plains Indians in their Final
Days o f Glory (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1976).
U In-depth explanation o f federal Indian policy and laws can be explored further by consulting: David H.
Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson, and Ro bert A. Williams, Jr. Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law,
4Ih ed. American Casebook Series. (St. Paul: West Group, 1998).

43

construction and continuation o f westward settlement and regional development. By
1944, the time o f the Garrison Dam, gross acreage remaining on the reservation was
around 643,368 acres: 579,838 trust lands and only 63,150 in the private hands o f both
Indian and non-Indians.13 Trust lands are defined as acreage with the title being held by
the United States government “in trust” while guaranteeing full-utilization by a
sovereign, Indian peoples such as the Three Tribes.14 (Figure 2)
r
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Indian land use was changing as well. Prior to 1870 the traditional system of
small patches of land separated by strips of weeds left growing remained predominant.
By the 1880s agricultural practices on the reservation approximated those of non-Indian
settlers on the plains."' Potatoes, turnips, and other vegetables introduced by Europeans
gained acceptance and did very well in the Missouri basin environment. The Three
Tribes were very successful in embracing agricultural practices promoted by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (B1A) to facilitate their “civilizing” and assimilation. Jacob Kauffman,
the BIA agent in 1881, viewed the progress of the Three Tribes as a successful
experiment.15167 In the 1890s the federal government undertook concentrated efforts to
make the Fort Berthold people self-supporting through farming and cattle production.
Despite occasional droughts, increased acreage devoted to wheat production created a
surplus, a testimony to the successes of the Three Tribes and potential realization of their
dream of self-sufficiency.18 The lands on the reservation proved fertile and productive as
the Three Tribes continued to prosper into the 1920s. By 1926, more than 63,411 acres
of rich, river bottom was in production for the Three Tribes, either for agriculture, or
more prominently, leased to non-Indian ranchers for cattle grazing.

15 Missouri River Basin Investigation Staff, Region 2, Bureau o f Indian Affairs, "Land Consolidation
Problems on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation arising from the Garrison Project,” April 20, 194S.
Revised, November 1, 1948. North Dakota State Water Commission Technical Reference Library
(NDSWCTR), North Dakota State Library, Bismarck.
16 These works provide descriptions o f agricultural pursuits o f the Three Tribes and other plains Indian
cultures: Waheenee. Waheenee: An Indian Girl's Story. Edited by Gilbert L Wilson (New York: Webb
Publishing, 1927. Reprint, Lincoln: University o f Nebraska press, 1981) and Douglas R. Hun. Indian
Agriculture In America: Prehistory to the Present (Lawrence: University o f Kansas Press, 1987).
17 Kauffman quoted in Meyer, Village Indians, 132.
IK

Ibid., 152.
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Looking back on the American West and in particular the use of water in the
development of western water resources, one of the early and immensely influential
characters is found in the persona of Major John Wesley Powell, geologist, explorer and
bureaucrat. He became a self-appointed champion of state water rights as opposed to
federal or private control. Speaking to the North Dakota State Constitutional Convention
in 1889 he said, “Civilization was bom in arid lands, the largest populations have
depended on irrigation, so it is an old problem. All you have to do is to learn the lessons
already taught by history ... lands you depend on depend on placing the water on the soil,
when you have learned to do that you are in no unfavorable conditions.”1920The dreams,
however, of farmers to produce and boosters to develop urban centers in North Dakota
clashed with the desire of the Three Tribes to exist in harmony with the land and the
dominant culture.
Powell warned that the quest to control water in the west would always be a battle
waiting to happen; North Dakota would be no different. Powell was a staunch advocate
for states’ rights and local popular control of water for irrigation, “Don’t let these streams
get out of the possession of the people. Fix it in your constitution that no corporation, no
9520
body of men, no capital can get possession of your waters.”
Powell went on to describe the North Dakota environment as follows; “The state
of North Dakota,” he said, “ has a curious position geographically in relation to
agriculture. The eastern portion of the State has sufficient rainfall for agricultural

19 “Importance o f Water Conservation” The Reclamation Era (Washington, D.C.: Bureau o f Reclamation,
September 1936), 201. Mary Scott Papers, E.B. Robinson Dept, o f Special Collections, Chester-Fritz
Library, University o f North Dakota, Grand Forks.
20 Powell quoted in Ibid., 201.

46

purposes; the western part has insufficient rainfall and the western portion is wholly
dependent on irrigation.”21 Hence the reclamation dream of irrigation to make the
“prairie bloom” would be applied to justify development and the harnessing of the
Missouri River.
The Missouri basin either furnishes too much water as in the floods of 1884,
1881, 1943, and 1951, or too little, as during the severe droughts of the 1860s, 1890s,
1920s and the dust bowl years of the 1930s.22 The United States Army Corps of
Engineers23 sought to discipline the mighty Missouri during the 1940s. Just as John
Wesley Powell advocated, control of the river with its raw and unbridled power was a
ripe prize for the Corps. But why was Missouri River development necessary when
North Dakota’s population was relatively sparse and other regions in the country were
producing sufficient amount of grain and cattle? Was additional irrigation and damming
necessary for the prosperity of the country? The river provided the answer to these
questions in 1943.
Missouri flooding claimed six lives, 70,000 acres of fertile bottomland and $8
million in damages in Omaha on April 12, 1943. In May another 540,000 acres were
inundated by its waters, causing an additional $7 million in damages. In June, after
960,000 acres and $32.5 million in damages in Kansas and Missouri, the call went forth
for control of the mighty Missouri.24 Between 1936 and 1950, some 200 people were

2! Powell quoted in Ibid., 202.
22 Lawson, Dammed Indians, 3-4.
23 The United States Army Corps o f Engineers will henceforth be referred to as simply “the Corps.”
24 Marian E. Ridgeway, The Missouri Basins ' Pick-Sloan Plan: A Case Study in Congressional Policy
Determination (Urbana: University o f Illinois Press, 1955), 3-5.
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killed and another 250,000 displaced by the river’s rampaging waters.2'^ This was the
environment that would see the Pick-Sloan Plan developed in order to tame the river
known as the “big muddy” and continue western water development which began in
earnest some twenty-years earlier.
Severe flooding in California’s Imperial Valley in the mid-1920s inspired the first
truly large-scale multiple-purpose water project. Hoover Dam on the Colorado provided
flood control and irrigation with the added bonus of hydroelectric power to finance its
construction and maintenance. The Hoover Dam set the precedent for the large federal
water projects typical of the New Deal and post-WWII periods: Grand Coulee Dam on
the Columbia and the upper Colorado, and Missouri River basin projects. During the
1930s Congress directed the Corps to study systematically the potential of some 200
rivers for navigation, hydropower, flood control and irrigation. The resulting “308
reports” laid the foundation for nationwide water resource development implemented
during the Depression and post-war years.2526
Western water development programs represented the triumph of the New Deal
and the Progressive era ideal by demonstrating that government would not merely
preserve but effectively control, manage, and improve the workings of natural processes
for human benefit. The progressive dream plus the promise of lucrative or pork-barrel
federal dollars created a powerful synergy that left Indian tribes without a voice or
platform to assert their rights to waters under proposed development despite the

25 U.S. Department o f the Army, Corps o f Engineers, The Development and Control o f the Missouri River
(Omaha: The Corps, 1947), 2. North Dakota State Water Commission Archives.
26 Andrews, Managing the Environment, 164.
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affirmation of these rights by the Winters decision. The advent of federally financed
flood control, however, created a powerful new opportunity for congressmen to seek
pork-barrel projects to benefit their own districts. During the period from 1936-1976 the
Corps built over 400 multi-purpose dams in 42 states. When combined with the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), and Soil
Conservation Service projects, nearly all major rivers and tributaries within the United
States was dammed.27
During the drought years of the 1930s low'er Missouri valley residents and states
opposed Dakota dams, fearing reduced river levels and reduced navigation channels to
support barge traffic. After the devastating floods of 1943, however, views changed as
downstream states realized that the only way to protect their cities, farms and $185
million navigation channel was through upstream dams on the Missouri in North and
South Dakota and Montana.28 This new demand for dams meant that dams on or near
Indian lands were eminent.
The prevailing attitude of many Americans in 1943 towards the environment was
reflected in the statement of Col. Miles Reber, Division Engineer of the Missouri District
at the 1943 Irrigation War Food Conference held in Bismarck, “America was carved from
wilderness, plains and mountains. Man proved himself fit to survive.”29 The Missouri
River was the last great river yet to succumb to man’s quest for control. The Corps set

27 Ibid., 165.
28 Robert Kelly Schneiders, Unruly River: Two Centuries o f Change Along the Missouri (Lawrence:
University Press o f Kansas, 1999), 166-67.
29 M iles Reber, “Irrigation War Food Conference” (Washington, D.C.: Dept, o f Agriculture, October 1943),
132-141. Mary Scott Collection.
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out systematically to convince the states of the Missouri Basin that plans for harnessing
the river needed their support and would benefit the entire region.
The timing of the ’43 floods now focused congressional, presidential, and
national attention on the Missouri. Speaking at the Missouri River States Commission
(MRSC) on May 21, 1943, Colonel Lewis A. Pick of the Corps asserted:
The Missouri River Valley is the last great valley in the U.S. whose water
potentialities have not been developed. If the river is not properly under control
the results will be disastrous.3031
Two separate elements of the Euro-American dream about the river now
converged: the dreams of the downstream states of the Missouri Basin to eliminate the
annual flooding, and the dreams of the upper basin states for irrigation. The MRSC’s
public-relations strategy, highlighting the dangers of an uncontrolled Missouri River,
proved successful in gaining widespread public acceptance of building dams and
reservoirs along the upper river. Harry Trustin, the editor of the Bismarck Tribune, who
was also the vice-chairman of North Dakota State Water Conservation Commission
wrote:
Colonel Pick is the first responsible official of the Federal Government to put into
words the dream that forward-looking North Dakotans long have entertained.
That is, to make the fullest use of the Missouri River, this State’s greatest
resource. If he fails to make his dream come true, it will not be because North
Dakota failed to back him up.n
Speaking before the MRSC, Senator Guy M. Gillette of Iowa stated:
I have never before been an enthusiast about Missouri River improvements.
Today I heard for the first time a comprehensive, definite plan for the
development of the whole Missouri River watershed. It isn’t to help Council
30 Colonel Pick quoted in Ibid., 169.
31 Trustin quoted in Bismarck Tribune, 16 June 1943.

50

Bluffs. It isn’t to Help Fort Peck. It isn’t to help Bismarck. It isn’t to help Sioux
City. It is to help the entire area ~ because that proposal has been made, because
it is comprehensive, because it is national in its scope and in its purpose, I am a
convert.'"
Governor John Moses of North Dakota spoke at the MRSC’s Bismarck meeting,
and pointed out that North Dakotans realized their state’s future was completely tied up
with the river. He urged the eight-state region to work in cooperation for the mutual
benefit of all. "We will have to be valley-conscious,” he said, ‘‘instead of state
conscious.”*33
Speaking at the same meeting, North Dakota Senator Gerald P. Nye declared his
support for Missouri development. “As a Member of Congress there is not a thing that I
can do that I won’t do to obtain the authorization and appropriations that we need for this
magnificent project.”34 Missouri project rhetoric, based on reclamation ethics of a
bygone era, succeeded because pro-developers in North Dakota, the Corps and
downstream states feared the repeat of 1943 and an uncontrollable river.
Talk of diverting the Missouri River was not new in the 1940s. As early as 1889
proposals circulated through Washington, D.C. on proposed diversions of water for
irrigation, not flood control, in North Dakota.35 In 1931, Corps engineers investigated the
site later used for the Garrison Dam but found it “entirely impracticable,” both because
the foundation materials lacked “sufficient crushing strength” to support a high dam and

j2 Senator Gillette quoted in Ridgeway, The Missouri Basin's, 13.
33 Quoted in Ibid., 13.
34 Quoted in Ibid., 14.
35 Elwyn B. Robinson, History o f North Dakota (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1966), 461-62.
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because, like all sites below the Yellowstone River, it would be subject to rapid silting.36
Major General Lyttle Brown, then Chief of Army Engineers in 1932, concluded that
further consideration of flood control dam at the Garrison site would be unjustified.3
Ironically, what one generation of engineers felt was unfeasible another considered
practical. However, site selection included many other factors, which were not in the
interest of Indians.
Site selection was always a tricky business and required both geological and
logistical considerations. Engineers had to consider sites near major transportation
centers and in close proximity of towns, hospitals and recreation facilities to house and
support the workers/8 Typical of most western water projects, and the reason the site
was rejected in 1931, none of the desired infrastructure was present at the Garrison site,
leading to the construction of the government town of Riverdale in 1947.
Geological factors also weighed heavily in the selection process. A narrow valley
is more conducive to dam construction for two simple reasons: cost and safety. Dams in
lower reaches of the river would cost exorbitant amounts of money because of earth fill
required to stem the river’s flow through wide valleys. Also, they were more likely to
experience failure because subsurface mineral deposits are less stable over long periods
of time.39 Dams in narrow valleys required less fill and when placed between cliffs

j6 Henry C. Hart, The Dark Missouri (Madison: University o f Wisconsin Press, 1957), 120-22.
37 Ibid.
38 US Army Corps o f Engineers, “Plan o f Improvements,” Comprehensive Report, Appendix 8, (Omaha:
The Corps, 1944), 14-15. Record Holdings, Riverdale Real Estate Office, US Army Corps o f Engineers,
Omaha District, Missouri Division, Riverdale, North Dakota. Lake Sakakawea Project records 1943present.
39 Ibid., 17.
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permitted the use of concrete like the dams along the Columbia and Colorado. The
Missouri had few places of this sort suitable for dam construction.40
Despite these physical limitations there loomed a more insidious reason for the
selection of the Garrison site. The Corps’ 1944 Comprehensive Report on Plan
Improvement stated:
In determining the location of multi-purpose reservoirs, consideration must be
given to the existence of cities that might be wholly or partially inundated by
these reservoirs, such as Bismarck and Williston in North Dakota. Accordingly,
the sites described in this report have been selected at such distances downstream
from these cities that sufficient storage [in reservoirs] will be provided without
undue flooding of expensive real estate.41
The lands to be flooded by the Garrison dam, mostly Indian, were not considered
as valuable as land and development near the non-Indian communities of Williston and
Bismarck. The dam was to be sufficiently above Bismarck to protect it and far enough
below Williston to avoid flooding it. Felix S. Cohen, the Department of Interior
Solicitor, stated in a memo to Commissioner Brophy that “the Garrison site was selected
by reason of the fact that a large proportion of the inundated area would be composed of
Indian lands.”42 Another reason for selecting the Garrison site was its location above
Bismarck. The storage limit for Garrison reservoir was dictated by the need to avoid
damages imposed upon and in the vicinity of Williston, near the Montana border. By late
1944 the Corps, USBR and MRSC had agreed to the site centered just below the Fort

40

Additional insight on Missouri basin dam selection is provided by Robert Kelley Schneiders, “Flooding
the Missouri Valley: The Politics o f Dam Site Selection and Design,” Great Plains Quarterly, 17 (Winter
1997): 237-249.

41 US Army Corps o f Engineers, “Plan o f Improvements,” 18.
42 Cohen to Brophy memo quoted in Sanish Sentinel, (N.Dak), July 1, 1943.
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Berthold Indian Reservation.43 There was no Indian representation in this process within
the MRSC, and neither the Corps nor the USBR ever solicited tribal input regarding the
Garrison site selection prior to 1944 44 Indian desires of preserving their lands and
communities were ignored in order to make the Pick-Sloan plan a reality.
The Pick-Sloan Plan has been called a compromise brought about by a shotgun
wedding and it certainly was a curious alliance between the Corps and the USBR, New
Deal rivals. Colonel Lewis A. Pick, of the Corps, threw together his plan in just under
ninety-days. Only ten pages long, it emphasized flood control through the construction
of five main-stem dams, to include the Garrison site originally rejected by the Corps in
1931. W. Glenn Sloan, assistant director of USBR at Billings, Montana, completed a
more detailed analysis of Missouri development over a five-year period. His plan placed
greater emphasis on irrigation and did not include a dam at the Garrison site stating that
sufficient flood control was achievable by the proposed Fort Peck, Oahe, Big Bend, Fort
Randall, and Gavins Point dams. The Sloan plan opposed the Garrison site because it
would only increase upstream navigation in Sioux City by 800 feet and the other
proposed main-stem dams would be sufficient for flood protection.45 These two federal
juggernauts went head-to-head, each seeking to gain the upper hand and lucrative dollars
associated with Missouri Basin development. The battle lines were drawn along state
lines.

43 US Army Corps o f Engineers, “Plan o f Improvements,” 18.
44 Ridgeway, The Missouri Basin’s, 56.
45 Meyer, Village Indians, 211-12.
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The Pick Plan was submitted to Congress on March 2, 1944, and instantly
contested by the US Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) and the National Reclamation
Association (NRA) because of a fear that excessive concern for lower basin navigation
and flood control would override potential water uses in the upper basin.46
The Sloan Plan was submitted to Congress a week later and supported by the
NRA, the railroads, Department of the Interior, and most western governors. North
Dakota, Wyoming and Montana presented united testimony favoring upstream irrigation
as preferred use against downstream navigation and flood protection.47 However, the
flood protection aspects loomed largest in the minds of a sympathetic public and the
powerful, down river congressional delegations. With the recent memories of the 1943
disaster prevalent in lower-basin communities, the public sought final liberation from the
rampages of a wayward Missouri River. Upper-basin dams would go a long way toward
preventing increased Mississippi water levels like those seen during the great floods of
1927 and 1943. Both agencies felt the pressure to merge the two plans into a single
comprehensive plan or face the establishment of a Missouri River Authority (MVA),
which neither supported, and the loss of control which they both desired to maintain.
Another factor leading to the merger of the Plans was the introduction and support
for establishing a Missouri River Authority (MVA) patterned after the TVA. President
Franklin Roosevelt was a staunch supporter of this initiative although the MRSC, the

46 John E. Thorson, River o f Promise, River o f Peril: The Politics o f Managing the Missouri River (Lincoln:
University Press o f Kansas, 1994), 64.
47

Ibid., 64.
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Corps and the USBR vehemently opposed the idea of an MVA.48 The Corps especially
desired to maintain control of construction and maintenance of the five main-stem dams
proposed by the plan. Then on October 16 and 17, 1944, Pick and Sloan met in Omaha
and created a compromise. They produced a short six-page paper, which was
incorporated into the Flood Control Act and passed into law by Congress on December
22, 1944.4950This compromise permitted the Corps to construct and maintain the mainstems dams, including the Garrison site originally opposed by Sloan, while the USBR
would build smaller dams along the tributaries and canals for irrigation. Although the
Three Tribes had no way of knowing it, their fate was sealed by this piece of legislation,
which they had no part in planning and on which they had never been consulted.30 The
Tribes, however, did not readily accept this fate.
Table 3. Comparison of Proposed Reservoirs created by the US Bureau of Reclamation
id US Army Corps of Engineers Plans51
Name o f Dam &
Reservoir
Livingston
Mission
Boysen (low)
Boysen (high)
Kane
Yellowtail
Ft. Peck
Medicine Lake
Crosby
Des Lacs

Name o f Stream

USBR Plan (acre-feet)

Corps Plan (acre-feet)

Y ellowstone
it

Omitted
892,000
730,000
Omitted
750,000
470,000
19,500,000
5,200,000
230,900
300,000

2,250,000
Omitted
Omitted
3,500,000
Omitted
Omitted
19,500,000
Not required

Big Horn
(t

“
“
Missouri
O ff stream
Des Lacs

“
it

48 Detailed analysis the proposed MVA can be found in the following: William B. Arthur. “MVA-Its
Backgrounds and Issues.” Congressional Digest Review 29 (January 1950): 13-14 and C. Frank. Keyser,
Missouri Valley Authority: Background and Analysis o f Proposal. Public Affairs Bulletin no. 42.
(Washington, D.C.: Library o f Congress, Legislative Reference Service, 1946).
49 Thorson, River o f Promise, River o f Peril, 67.
50 Meyer, Village Indians, 212,
51 John T. Tucker, “Comparison o f Reports by USBR and Corps o f Engineers as based on the ND water
plan o f 1942 for the Comprehensive Development o f the Water Resources in the Missouri Basin,”
(Washington: The Author, 1944), .34. NDSWCTRL.
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“

Sheyenne
Table 3 (cont.)
Jamestown

Sheyenne
James

800,000

“

G arrison

M issou ri

O m itted

1 9 ,500,000

Oak Creek
Oahe
Big Bend
Ft. Randall
Gavins Point

1,500,000

“
“
u
«
“
Total:

Omitted
19,500,000
250,000
5.100,000
Omitted
(13) 55,322,900

6,000,000
6,000,000
Omitted
6,000,000
200,000
(8) 62,950,000

Since the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934, the Tribes of Fort
Berthold had exercised their sovereignty by adopting a constitution and electing a tribal
council. As early as March 1943,when a group of engineers began surveying the area
around Garrison and further upstream, local newspapers had taken it for granted that a
dam was in prospect. The Sanish Sentinel headlined its report on their activities, “A Dam
Question” and commented, “There is big news in the air. But we cannot get to it.”'
Hopefully the newspaper remarked, the “dam will be located where it will do the most
good to the most people.” Later that summer the Sentinel reported that the plan outlined
by Pick and Sloan would take care of the needs of the area for the next century and
support millions of people.5253 The Tribes understood the implications clearly, possibly
because their experience with federal agencies in the past gave them insight others in the
region lacked. However, the Three Tribes would not wait for the federal agencies to
inform them of the Pick-Sloan plan, which was being developed despite their opposition
to it.

52 Sanish Sentinel, (N.Dak.j, May 20, 1943
53 Sanish Sentinel, (N.Dak.), July 1, 1943.
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On November 15, 1943, the tribal council passed a resolution opposing the
construction of any dam adversely affecting the reservation. The resolution stated:
A dam below the Fort Berthold reservation is being contemplated for future
actions by Congress of the United States in cooperation with the state of North
Dakota, which action, if realized, will destroy by permanent flood all the bottom
land of the said reservation, causing untold material and economic damage to the
Three Affiliated Tribes.54
The Tribes were not interested in selling their lands so they took the initiative to
offer alternative dam sites that the Corps would not even consider. The Tribes
commissioned civilian engineer Daniel C. Walser to locate a viable alternative to the
Garrison site. (Figure 3) He concluded, like Sloan of the USBR had, that the other
proposed dams; Oahe, Big Bend, Fort Randall, and Gavins Point, together with the Fort
Peck storage, would provide the desired flood control, increased navigation, and
hydroelectric power for the region.55 In addition, a dam built across the main stem on the
upper portions of the reservation would generate power more cheaply over at the
Garrison site. The alternate site would save about $1 million in construction costs alone.
In response to this alternate site Colonel Pick of the Corps asserted that “it would not be a
project that we could justify or that I would recommend.”56
The Corps’ reputation for arrogance towards civilian engineers and the general
public was legendary. The fierce confrontation between General Humphreys, Chief

54 Floyd Montclair, Fort Berthold Indians o f North Dakota, (Minot: Dakota State Journal, 1946), 1. Four
Bears Museum, Tribal Archives, Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, New Town, North Dakota.
55 Daniel C. Walser, “A Study and Report on the Various Plans Heretofore Submitted to the Congress in
Regard to the Upper Missouri River Basin,” March 15, 1946. Four Bears Museum.
56 Quoted in Sanish Sentinel, (N. Dak), July 24, 1947.
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Engineer of the Coips, and James Eads a civilian engineer, in 1874 illustrates the nature
of this conflict.
The debate over civil works on the Mississippi grabbed the attention of the nation
throughout the spring and summer of 1874 as newspapers spread hydraulic theories
across front pages, not only in river cities such as St. Louis, New Orleans, and Cincinnati
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Figure 3. Map of the Lieu Lands and Alternate Dam Site57

but in Chicago, Boston, and New York.?8 Increasingly, the debate became one of civilian
versus military engineers. Meanwhile, one senator declared: “Every attempt that has ever

57 Ralph H. Case, Tribal Counsel, “Fort Berthold Dam Site vs. The Garrison Dam Site” Three Affiliated
Tribes Tribal Council (Washington DC: Byron S. Adams, 1947) n.p. Four Bears Museum.
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been made to induce the Corps of Engineers to listen to the recommendations made by
the ablest civil engineers in the country has been resisted with an obduracy that is beyond
beliefs*59
During the 1927 Mississippi Flood the Corps’ plan to save New Orleans was to
dynamite an upriver levy protecting a community of ten thousand. The community’s
residents were predominantly black and their homes would be sacrificed in order to save
the city of New Orleans. The people were compelled to sacrifice their homes for those
living in larger communities up and down river. The Corps would consider no
alternatives; in this instance, as on Fort Berthold, the needs of many outweighed the
needs of the few. As a fundamental principle of democracy, this attitude has remained
consistent and at times is justifiable; however, future scholarship of this concept is
needed.
Although the Garrison Dam was authorized by the 1944 Flood Control Act the
Act did not appropriate the necessary funding for the project. The Tribes were successful
in taking advantage of Congressional dawdling over funding to ensure that their voices
were heard. Colonel Pick and his staff attended a meeting on Fort Berthold on December
6, 1946, at the BIA agency building located in the doomed community of Elbowoods.
The purpose of this meeting was to get the Indians on board and gain their support for the
project with assurance that their interests were taken care of. The Corps, however,
displayed its unwillingness to alter its preconceived plans and its lack of cultural
sensitivity in the remarks by Colonel Pick at the meeting in Elbowoods. “Several

’’8 Barry, Rising Tide, 73.
59 Ibid., 74.
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conferences have been held with you people,” Pick said, “during which the plan for the
construction of this dam has been discussed. During these conferences it was recognized
that you were particularly desirous of preventing the construction of the dam at the
Garrison site rather than obtaining compensation for the lands to be inundated.”60 Pick
seemed unable to understand that land was more than a commodity to the Three Tribes, it
was life and the river was its life-blood.
Those tribal members attending the meeting addressed quite eloquently their
views of the land and the methods used to inform the public of the Corps plans. Robert
Lincoln of the Charging Eagle District stated:
We have known that plans were under way for the government to construct
Garrison Dam but never did they come to consult us until its own plans were
completed informing us as to what they proposed to do. We are much like the
hen and her young fighting off the hawk that is swooping down to attack.61
Opinion was sharply divided, Snowbird, an interpreter explained, had told his
people that life meant change; that it was a process of continually adjusting to new and
unexpected situations.62 The tribe’s legal counsel, Ralph H. Case, urged cooperation by
the tribes and consideration of the alternative site by the Corps. “If the Lfpper Dam is
built, it will save all the heartaches,” he said, “but in addition, it will save $1 million of
destruction and probably $20 million in relocation costs, it will save 340 families.”63
(See Figure 3 on page 59)

60 Statements from a General Meeting between the Corps, BIA officials, and tribal members (Elbowoods,
ND: Fort Berthold, May 27, 1946.) n.p. Four Bears Museum.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
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However, suspicions over past dealings with federal government persisted
amongst the tribal elders. James Driver, Sr. from Shell Creek said:
The most thing that is dearest to me is the land within the limits of the Fort
Berthold Reservation. I don’t want to be sitting here, without my knowledge, to
be flooded over. Your promises are never true. You always fool the Indian
people. Change your plans time and again and still you are not satisfied at this
time. Now you want to take our land and tribe out somewhere else.64
The irony is that the Three Tribes of Fort Berthold had never abrogated nor
broken any treaty or agreement made with the United States. Chester Smith also from
Shell Creek said, “We have observed every treaty that the United States commanded.
Therefore, I love my land and I don’t want to be flooded over.”6'^ Echoing this sentiment
and the final speaker of the meeting, Daniel Wolfe from Elbowoods declared:
We are told that they would give us land in exchange for the land that are to be
inundated. That the land they give us would be comparable in size and little bit
better then what we have, but there is no land that would compare with the land
that we have at the present time. Now I heard the remarks of General Pick here
saying that he would do his best to give us the best land in exchange for our lands,
but I doubt his word because they have fooled us. They have never live[d] up to
their promises. There will be no land in comparison in what we got here.6667
Their words fell upon the deaf ears of the Corps as the appropriations bill finally
passed through Congress in 1946 with a proviso that the War Department would have to
procure, “Lands comparable in quality and sufficient in area to compensate said Tribes
for the land inundated by the Dam.”

64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 War Department Civil Appropriation Act, Statute at Large, 63:1026-28, 1049 (1947). NDSWCTRL.
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Lieu lands, a term used to define lands offered “in lieu” of those lands currently
possessed, would be located and rejected by the Three Tribes and the BIA. Allen G.
Harper, area BIA director, would send a letter to the District Engineer Colonel W.W.
Wanamaker dated September 11, 1946, responding to the proposed lieu lands. In it
Harper reaffirmed the Indians’ position that “reservation conditions simply could not be
duplicated by any tract or combination of tracts.. ..”68
At the 1946 meeting with the Corps, one Indian speaker displayed a sympathy for
non-Indian settlers that would be displaced had they accepted the lieu lands. “The
residents of the lieu area are pioneers of that country, and I do not think it right to compel
them to leave their home.”6970 Although facing certain injustice, tribal members were able
to convey what the government could not, compassion for those facing displacement.10
The Corps’ relationship with the Three Tribes is best seen through the eyes of nonIndians familiar with their plight.
Rev. H.W. Case, a Congregationalist who worked with Indians for 40 years
stated, “The engineers, as I recall, made no personal approach to the people and their
problems. On our reservation [Fort Berthold], if a man owned a strip of land, they cut it
in half so he couldn’t make a living on the rest.”71 Present at the 1946 and subsequent

68 Letter from Allen G. Harper to W.W. Wanamaker, 11 September 1946. Record Holdings, Lake
Sakakawea Project.
69 Statements from a General Meeting between tire Corps, BIA officials, and tribal members, (Elbowoods,
ND: Fort Berthold, May 27, 1946.) n.p. Four Bears Museum.
70 An aspect o f the story o f Garrison dam worthy o f future scholarship, although not explored here, is the
dislocation and treatment o f the many the non-Indian residents, their story is worth telling.
71 Letter from H.W. Case to Arthur Morgan, August 12, 1968, quoted in Morgan, Dams and Other

Disasters, 53.
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meetings with the Corps, Rev. Case noted, ”My own observation was that the
government had sent a man out [Col. Pick] who knew so little of Indian history and
people. One could see this when he said in his approach, ‘I want to show you where v/e
will place you people’ ”7273
Rev. Case summarized the treatment of the Three Tribes by the Corps and
Congress, and the American people’s failure to uphold the Three Tribes basic human
rights as follows:
It is sufficient to help folks to realize what havoc the US Army Engineers have
brought about through their inability to deal in human relations. The chief of the
USA Engineers down through the personnel, on the Fort Berthold situation,
showed their inability to accept American Indians as people too. I was in the
middle of the fight for justice among these people on Fort Berthold where the
largest displacement of people took place in the Missouri Basin development, and
saw and heard so much discrimination. What occurred as to the Tribes in the
upper Missouri was not the accident of circumstances. It was the working out of
philosophy of life. An organization, such as the Corps of Engineers, should be
especially concerned that not only in its chief functions, but also in all functions
that
concern the life of the people, it should conduct itself in such a manner*71 that it
,
is an asset and not a blight. Great power should carry great responsibility.
So what were the causes of the Corps’ callousness? In essence, the Corps’
leadership was ignorant of Indian rights. They also have consistently displayed an
unwillingness to respond to technical or political pressure preventing them from
considering alternatives to eroding the Three Tribes land-base.
However, despite numerous resolutions passed by the tribal council, rejection of
the lieu lands, and testimony before the Congressional community as well as the
newspapers of the region and the nation, the pleas of the Tribes would go on unheeded.

72 Quoted in Ibid., 47.
73 Letter from Case to Morgan, September 2, 1968, quoted in Morgan, Dams and Other Disasters, 57-58.
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Having already spent $6 million on infrastructure in preparation for Dam construction at
the Garrison site, the Corps and its lobbyist would be successful in wielding the doctrine
of eminent domain and forcing capitulation by the Indians.
The 1947 Congressional session approved an appropriation of $20,105,625 for the
Garrison Dam and Reservoir Project. Of this sum, $5,105,625 was earmarked to make
the cash settlement with Indians of the Fort Berthold Reservation whose lands would be
inundated by the reservoir. {Figure 4)
P l« t« So. 2

Figure 4. Segments of the Reservation Above the Garrison Reservoir Site74

4 MRBI Staff, “Land Consolidation Problem,” n.p. NDSWCTRL.
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Table 4. Area of segments illustrated by Figure 4.

Northern Segment
N.Eastern Segment
Eastern Segment
Southern Segment
Western Segment
TOTAL

Indian-owned (Acres)
19,860
21,432
67,378
74,498
243,245
426,413

Alienated (Acres)77
5,622
6,159
17,673
5,160
9,516
44,130

Total (Acres)
25,482
27,591
85,051
79,658
252,761
470,543

The Act also promised irrigation of tribal lands and free electrical power for the
remaining portions of the reservation.*76 These terms were forced upon the Indians, not
obtained by their free consent. As Council Chairman Carl Whitman, Jr. asserted,
“agreement to the bill was the only recourse left to them.”77 The battle had been lost.
Although non-Indian settlers were forced to leave their homes, their situation was
slightly different having obtained or purchased the land from the government, whereas
the Indians, as original occupants of the soil, had treaty and water rights maintained by
the government. The Lonewolf decision now lorded over the Tribes as settlement
legislation progressed through Congress that would take away their lands for the public
good.78
The Corps produced and distributed propaganda to communities throughout the
state in 1947, and continued to tout the possibilities of the Dam. “The Project will bring

'5 Alienated acres are defined are non-Indian acreage within the reservation boundaries after the inundation.
76 Garfield B. Nordum, “Garrison Dam and Reservoir Project North Dakota ’’(Bismarck: ND State Dept, o f
Public Instruction, Sept 1947), 4.
77 Meyer, Village Indians, 217.
78

Further analysis o f the 1904 Lonewolf decision and its implications towards Indian policy can be found
in Blue Clark’s, Lonewolf v. Hitchock: Treaty Rights and Indian Law at the End o f the Nineteenth Century,
(Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1999).
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immeasurable wealth to North Dakota. Multi-purpose storage for irrigation and power,
.. .the recreational value of such a body of water [Lake Sakakawea] can hardly be
visualized in advance of its creation.”7980 Yet, as with all projects that yield great wealth
there was a heavy burden or cost to be exacted not only from the environment, but in this
case, at the expense of the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara of Fort Berthold.
The Tribal leadership was summoned to Washington to sign the agreement that
extinguished their rights to the land and acceptance of the authorized payment having
refused the lieu lands offered by the War Department. On May 21, 1948, a distraught
Council Chairman George Gillette signed the agreement as other members looked on
(Figures 5).

G e o r g e G i lle tte ( l e f t f o r e g r o u n d ) , c h a ir m a n o f th e F o r t B e r th o ld I n d ia n T r ib a l B u s in e s s C o u n c il, c o v e rs
h is f a c e a s h e w e e p s in t h e o f f ic e o f t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e I n te r io r , J . A . K ru g . O n M a y 2 0 , 1 9 4 8 , K ru g
s ig n e d a c o n t r a c t w h e r e b y t h e t r i b e s o ld 1 5 5 ,0 0 0 a c r e s o f its b e s t r e s c r v a tio n a l la n d in N o r t h D a k o t a f o r
t h e G a r r is o n L a k e a n d r e s e r v o ir p r o je c t. G i l le t te s a id o f t h e a g r e e m e n t, “ T h e m e m b e rs o f t h e trib a l
c o u n c i l s ig n t h i s c o n t r a c t w i t h h e a v y h e a r t s . . . R i g h t n o w t h e f u t u r e d o e s n o t l o o k g o o d t o u s . ” ( W id e
. W o r l d „Ju*o.trw A — ------------------—

~ ~

Figure 5. Signing of the 1948 agreement80

79 Nordum, Garrison Darn, 6.
80 Morgan, Darns, n.p.
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In tears, Gillette said in one final effort at justice, “The truth is, as everyone
knows our Treaty of Fort Laramie, made in 1851 and our tribal constitutions are being
tom into shreds by this contract.”81 He later justified his actions by explaining that the
building of Garrison Dam was inevitable and that the only thing to do was get as liberal
settlement out of Congress as possible.82
The Congress and the Corps forced this legislation upon the Indians and the Three
Tribes certainly did not at any time favor it. So, having made concessions, the Three
Tribes had to leave their precious river bottom land and homes for the treeless, waterless,
relatively barren prairies, where temperatures could range from minus forty to more than
one hundred degrees above zero.
Some criticism of the Indians’ position is justified. Perhaps they held an
unrealistic dream believing they would be able to halt construction of the dam. Their
position was compounded by not accepting the lieu lands in Mercer and Oliver counties
that would have at least offered a similar environment to that lost in the taking area.
However, it is important to understand and appreciate the dilemma of the Three Tribes
and ask the question: when would the government and the American public stop forcing
Indians to sacrifice and change?
Damming a river radically alters the surrounding ecosystems. Dams also collect
silt. Nutrient-rich sediment, which normally provides nutrients for downstream
organisms or settles on agricultural flood plains, instead accumulates behind the turbines

81 Quoted in Sanish Sentinel, (N. Dak), May 27, 1948.
82 Sanish Sentinel, (N. Dak), June 16, 1948.

68

and dams.8384 The natural habitat lost by the construction of the Missouri River main stem
dams was significant: Grassland and timber 127,379 acres; bluffland 205,565 acres;
tributary mouths 10; main channel miles 207; and an erosion zone of 46,221 acres was
created.

Although waterpower was basically a nonpolluting, renewable energy source,

harnessing it by means of hydroelectric dams involved tremendous ecological, social, and
cultural costs.
The flooding of their valley broke the existing balance between range, shelter,
water and shade and disrupted the agricultural and livestock enterprises of the Indians,
which had provided seventy percent of their earned net income. Roughly 156,000 acres
of the reservation was flooded and the remaining reservation was carved into five isolated
and geographically separated segments (Figure 4 on page 63). According to the census
of tribal membership in 1946, there was a total reservation population of 2, 034 in which
1,700 were forced to relocate.85
The Three Tribes were denied their Winters rights, since Indians were not allowed
to fish or to graze their cattle along the reservoir, nor could they water their cattle at the
reservoir’s edge. Their mineral rights were forfeited, hunting and trapping, royalties
from oil or gas if discovered, prohibited. The 20,000 kilowatts of electricity from the
dam, promised at no cost, was not provided by the Corps.86 Irrigation facilities of the

Andrews, Managing the Environment, 244.
84 Thorson, River o f Promise, 83.
85 U.S. Department o f the Interior, Bureau o f Indian Affairs, “Social and Economic Report on the Future o f
Fort Berthold “ (Billings: BIA, 1948), 2. Record Holdings, Lake Sakakawea Project.
86

Ibid., 3.
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dam and reservoir were not made available to the Indians and non-Indians and remains
unrealized dream, although much of acreage remaining is not suitable for irrigation.
By October 1947 construction along the embankment was well under way at
Garrison Dam site. The project employed over 2,300 men, constructing what was then
the largest rolled-earth dam in the world while creating the third largest man-made
reservoir in the country, Lake Sakakawea. Costing $294 million, Garrison dam lay
12,000 feet long, 210 feet high, 2,600 feet wide at the base and 60 feet at the top, in all,
roughly 70,000,000 yards of earth and 1,500,000 yards of concrete. Construction was
completed in fall of 1953. (Figure 6)87

87 Photo Archives, US Army Corps o f Engineers, Real Estate Division, Riverdale, ND.
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Once filled, the new reservoir named Lake Sakakawea extended 178 miles from
the dam northwest to Williston, ND. The lake averages between two and three miles in
width, and is six miles wide at its widest point. The maximum depth of the lake is 180
feet at the face of the dam. The lake covers 368,000 acres, has 1,300 miles of shoreline,
and can store nearly 23 million acre-feet of water. That amount of water would cover the
entire state of North Dakota with about six inches of water. The drainage area of the lake
is about 181,400 square miles.88
The Corps estimates that from 1954, when integrated operations of the main-stem
dams and reservoirs began to 1992, approximately $2.7 billion in flood damages have
been prevented.89 hi addition, an estimated $7.7 billion in flooding damages were
avoided during the severe 1993 Mississippi/Missouri floods. However, the benefits of
irrigation promised by the original Pick-Sloan plan have never fully materialized.
One cannot help but see the struggle of the Three Tribes reflected in this
statement conveyed at the 1961 American Indian Conference held in Chicago:
When our lands are taken for a declared public purpose, scattering our people and
threatening our continual existence, it grieves us to be told that a money payment
is the equivalent of all the things we surrender. Our forefathers could be generous
when all the continent was theirs, they could cast away whole empires for a
handful of trinkets for their children. But in our day, each remaining acre is a
promise that we will still be here tomorrow. Were we paid a thousand times the
market value of our lost holdings, still these payments would not suffice. Money
never mothered the Indian people, as the land has mothered them, nor have any
people become more closely attached to the land, religiously and traditionally.90

88 US Army Corps o f Engineers. Omaha District, Lake Sakakawea: Garrison Dam, North Dakota (Omaha:
U.S. GPO, 1994). Record Holdings, Lake Sakakawea Project.
89 US Army Corps o f Engineers, Missouri River Division, Missouri River Division, 1987-1988 Annual
Operation Plan, (Omaha: The Corps, December 1992), 90. Record Holdings, Lake Sakakawea Project.
90 American Indian Conference proceedings, Declaration o f Indian Purpose, (Chicago: n.p., 1961), 16.
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The river itself was changed from a cold, free-flowing mighty river to a series of
warm-water reservoirs with genteel stretches of river between. Few benefits other than
recreation have come to the state of North Dakota from the Garrison Dam. Cheap
electricity has not brought new industries and prosperity to the state or the Three Tribes.
The dreams of the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Ankara, the Three Affiliated Tribes,
remained flooded and the Missouri was no longer free.

Figure 7. Fours Bears Monument After Relocation.
symbol for the perseverance of the Three Tribes.

91 Robinson, North Dakota, 465.
92 Meyer, Village Indians, n.p.

Continued to serve as a

CHAPTER FOUR
REMOVAL AND RELOCATION: A HISTORICAL COMPARISON

Having been forced by the Congress to cede their lands for construction of the
Garrison Dam the Three Tribes faced many challenges as the ensuing reservoir required
their complete removal from their river valley homes. This legislation and the impending
construction of Garrison Dam was a continuation of federal Indian policy in which the
needs of Indian people were subordinated to the needs of the larger, dominant EuroAmerican society. But this is an old story that can be re-told in the languages of other
American nations.
The Cherokee nation was one of the Five Civilized Tribes as labeled by early
American historians. They were considered “civilized” since they had adopted agrarian
ways and their prospect of assimilation by the emerging American nation seemed
assured. In the 1820s they were amongst the first native peoples to adopt a constitution
patterned after the United States’. In the 1830s, facing relocation, they sought relief in
the young nation’s courts rather than through armed conflict. The reward for their
seeking peaceful and equitable treatment by the United States government was their
eventual removal and the tragic “Trail of Tears.”1

1 There are many publications relative to Cherokee history, for additional information 1 would suggest the
following: John Finger’s, The Eastern Band o f Cherokees 1819-1900 (Knoxville: University o f Tennessee
Press, 1994); John Ehle’s, The Trail o f Tears: The Rise and Falls o f the Cherokee Nation (New York:
Anchor Books, 1988), and Stanley W. H oig’s, The Cherokees and their Chiefs: In the Wake o f Empire.

(Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1998).
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Nearly a hundred years later the Three Tribes were considered model “Indian
citizens” and candidates for assimilation. They had maintained peaceful relations with
the federal government despite the pressures to join other Indian nations that had taken up
arms against the government in the 1860s. Having adopted their own constitution
pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the Tribes seemed to be following in
the steps of the Cherokee a hundred years earlier. By 1948, the Tribes had relented to
government pressures and entered into a forced agreement resulting in the inundation of
155,000 acres of their reservation and eventual forced relocation.
After the taking, the residual reservation was divided into five segments. (Figure
3) The Agency, which had been at Elbowoods, was moved to New Town, a point located
off the western edge of the reservation. The southern segment was the farthest away
from the Agency, approximately 120 miles by the nearest road, which was a poorly
graveled highway, impassable in wet weather like most North Dakota roads in the 1940s.
The other segments were closer, yet all were so far away that two-way radio stations were
employed to transact business with the Agency at New Town.2
Through careful comparison it becomes evident that although the characters have
changed the circumstances of these two episodes remain strikingly similar. The story of
the relocation of the Three Tribes to facilitate the construction of the Garrison Dam and
ensuing reservoir paralleled the policies of removal of the Cherokees.
Once the Three Tribes had reached their agreement with the federal government
in 1948 the plans for relocation began in earnest. By October 1947 construction along

2 Meyer, Village Indians, 220.
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the embankment was well under way at Garrison Dam site, (Figure 8 and 9) with
construction completed in the fall of 1953.
In a survey conducted by Gordon MacGregor in 1946, “The ‘reservation’ was to
the Fort Berthold Indian considered his homeland. They were never assigned this land,”
he continued, “or forced to reside on it as prisoners of war as were many tribes of the
nomadic plains culture.”34 The Missouri River bottoms had been their homeland prior to
the coming of the Euro-Americans. The Three Tribes were occupying ancestral lands, so
too had the Cherokee occupied lands within the boundaries of the state of Georgia.

3 Gordon MacGregor, “Altitude o f the Fort Berthold Indian regarding Removal from the Garrison
Reservoir Site and Future Administration o f Their Reservation,” North Dakota History> 16, no. 1 (1949):
56.
4 Photo Archives, Real Estate Division.
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In his final message to Congress on December 2, 1828, John Quincy Adams
foreshadowed the coming federal policy.
And when we have had the rare good fortune of teaching them [Indians] the arts
of civilization and the doctrine of Christianity we have unexpectedly found them
forming in the midst of ourselves communities claiming to be independent of ours
and rivals of sovereignty within the territories of the members of our Union. This
state of things requires that a remedy should be provided, a remedy which while it
shall do justice to those unfortunate children of nature [Indians], may secure to the
members of our confederation their rights of sovereignty and soil.^
The remedy Adams recommended was the removal of the tribes to points west of
current settlements in the eastern portions of the United States. President Andrew
Jackson pursued removal regarding the Five Civilized Tribes. In his fifth State of the
Union address to Congress on December 3, 1833, Jackson conveyed his true feelings
toward the Cherokees, “They [Indians] have neither the intelligence, the industry, the
moral habits, nor the desire of improvement which are essential to any favorable change
in their condition.”56 The Cherokee, were in the way of progress and the federal
government’s effort to develop and exploit natural resources. As the population of
Georgia grew, non-Indian farmers required more land and it was upon Cherokee land that
they cast their eyes.
The discovery of gold within the Cherokee Nation lands in 1829 fired Georgians
with new vigor for Cherokee lands, and many rushed into the region in violation of the
Indians territorial rights. Neither the government of the United States nor Georgia took
action to impede this encroachment upon Cherokee lands. As historian Francis Paul

5 President Adams quoted in Prucha, The Great Father, 190.
6 President Jackson quoted in James D. Richardson, A Compilation o f the Messages and Papers o f the
Presidents, 1789-1897, Vol 111 1833-1841 (Washington: GPO, 1898) 33.
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Prucha has stated, “The Jacksonian and Georgian contention was that the Indians had
only a possessory right to the soil, a mere right of occupancy.”7
The irony is that prior to the enactment of the removal policy, assimilation was
the course Indians were urged to follow and the Cherokee certainly had taken steps to
adopt many non-Indian ways. The federal government had urged Indians to cultivate the
land and develop other domestic arts such as spinning and weaving as well as learning
the English language. Many Cherokee received formal education in English schools;
they developed a written language of their own and published a newspaper, the Cherokee
Phoenix. They had followed southern economy and many owned black slaves upon
extensive plantations. On July 26, 1827, the Cherokee nation adopted a written
constitution patterned after that of the US. It was evident that the Cherokee did not
correspond to the common perception of Indian tribes as nomads and wanderers requiring
transformation into agriculturists that was a part of the rhetoric justifying removal.8
The policy of removal, however, was implemented and the Cherokee as well the
other “civilized” tribes, the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Seminole and Creek were removed.
The Senate passed the removal bill 28 to 19 on April 24 and the House by the narrower
margin of 102 to 97 on May 26. President Andrew Jackson sealed the Cherokees fate by
signing it on May 24, 1830.9
The desire for Indian lands was not the only motivation for removal. Having
adopted their own constitution in 1827 and having declared themselves a sovereign

7 Prucha, Great Father, 196.
8 Ibid., 185.
9 Ibid., 206.
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nation the Cherokee asserted a challenge to both Georgia and the United States regarding
sovereignty. Were the Cherokee an independent nation? The question was settled in
1831 by the landmark case of Cherokee

v.

Georgia in which the Supreme Court delivered

the opinion that Indians tribes were “domestic dependent nation[s].”101 Although Chief
Justice John Marshal offered moral support to the Cherokees the decision ultimately
sided with Georgia and the injunction to forestall enforcement of Georgia law over the
tribe was denied.
In yet another Supreme Court case, Worcester v. Georgia in 1832, the Cherokee
pressed for recognition of the supremacy of federal treaties with the Indians, and that
Georgia’s attempts to assert control over the native population would be undermined.
This hope soon turned to despair, however, when Jackson refused to enforce the court’s
opinion which had sided with the Indians.
“The clouds may gather,” the principle chief of the Cherokee, John Ros,s wrote to
a friend in 1830, “thunders roar and lightning Hash from acts of Georgia under the
approbation of General Jackson’s neutrality, but the Cherokees with an honest patriotism
and love of country will still remain peaceably on their own soil.”11 The only recourse
left to the Cherokee was to seek a wide audience and hope for public support at the
injustices being exacted upon them. Unfortunately, their voice failed to be heard above
the sounds of developers, expansionists, and states rights advocates.
No practical alternative to Indian removal ever came before the government and
the alternative of leaving a portion of the United States in Indian hands was unacceptable.

10 Chief Justice John Marshal quoted in Prucha, Great Father, 197.
11 John Ross quoted in Hoig, The Cherokees and their Chiefs, 146.
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“Y ears since I stated to them my belief that if the States chose to extend their laws over
them it would not be in the power of the Federal Government to prevent it,” declared
Jackson in 1831. “My opinion remains the same,” he continued, “and 1 can see no
alternative for them but their removal to the West or a quiet submission to state laws.”12
The Cherokee could not fully understand removal because they had been
successful in their transition to an agrarian-based economy and had loyally defended the
frontier against the Creeks and the British in the War of 1812. To them, as to all Indian
peoples, their homeland was a sacred place and so closely related to their cultural identity
that to uproot them would be as destructive as trying to transplant an ancient oak tree.13
The Three Tribes echoed this sentiment having also adopted a constitution, displayed
years of loyalty to the federal government and developed a growing agrarian economy.
The Cherokee ruling elite, John Ross, Charles Hicks, Elijah Hicks, Major Ridge,
William Hicks, John Ridge, Elias Boudinot and others believed that their constitution was
evidence of Cherokee maturiiy. i he leaders wished to assert their right as an
independent nation or state within the union. They also hoped to forestall the Jacksonian
efforts for compulsory removal west. Utaletah, a mixed blood, conveyed optimism for
the future, “Our nation as a political body has reached an important crisis and bids fair for
rapid progress in the path of civilization. While at the same time,” he continued, “ we

12 Andrew Jackson Senate address o f Feb 22, 1831, quoted in James D. Richardson, A Compilation o f the
Messages and Papers o f the Presidents 1789-1897, Pol II, 1817-1833 (Washington: GPO, 1896), 541.

Ij William G. McLoughlin, Cherokees and Missionaries, 1789-1839 (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1984), 106.
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can say with no ordinary degree of exultation, that agriculture is gradually gaining an
ascendancy amongst us equaled by no other Indian tribe.”14
Under pressure from both federal and state governments the Cherokee people
became divisive and factionalized. The Treaty Party headed by John Ridge and Elias
Boudinot recognized early in 1832 the inevitability of removal. Subsequently, they went
before the Tribal Council to urge seeking an acceptable agreement with the federal
government during the summer of 1832 and were overwhelmingly turned down and
branded as traitors to the nation. The Removal Party persisted, although they never
represented more than 10% of the population. Seeing an opportunity the federal
government was quick to capitalize in this division and the Treaty of New Echota was
conceived in December 1835. Although Ridge’s group was a minority, in the eyes of the
government they spoke on behalf of the nation, the agreement was for $5 million and the
exchange of all current lands for those in the northeastern comer of Oklahoma.15
In his annual message to Congress, President Jackson was quick to declare
victory:
The national policy, founded alike in interest and in humanity, so long and so
steadily pursued by the Government for the removal of the Indian tribes originally
settled on this side of the Mississippi to the West of that river, may be said to have
been consummated by the conclusion of the late treaty with the Cherokees.16
In May of 1836 the Senate narrowly ratified the Treaty of New Echota by one
vote, establishing the deadline for complete removal by May 23, 1838.

14 Quoting from the Cherokee Phoenix, May 6, 1828, in Ibid., 233.
13 McLoughlin, Missionaries, 307.
16 Andrew Jackson’s State o f the Union address, December 5, 1836, quoted in Richardson, Vol III, 256.
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The other faction representing some 15,668 Cherokees out of 18,000 headed by
the principal chief John Ross, cried foul and rejected the treaty. In a letter to President
Martin Van Buren, Ralph Waldo Emerson declared, ‘The American President and
Congress, neither saw nor heard them and have contracted to drag them over mountain
and rivers to the west. Sir, does the government think the people of the United States are
become so savage and mad? You sir, will bring down that chair on which you sit and the
name of this nation will stink to the world.”17 There was great public outcry; however,
troops would soon be dispatched to begin the process of rounding up the Cherokee people
for expulsion to foreign lands in the West.
The Cherokee people did not take up arms to resist removal. Leaders such as
John Ross ensured to the best of their abilities that the people would migrate peacefully.
“We are now about to take our final leave and kind farewell to our native lands, the
country that the great spirit gave our Fathers. It is with sorrow that we are forced by the
white man to quit the scenes of our childhood.. .we bid farewell to all we hold dear,” said
George Hicks as one of the last groups assembled for movement westward in November
of 1838.18 Although the Cherokee sought a delay for a spring migration the government
was adamant that they be completely removed by the close of 1838. This late fall
departure meant that winter would be upon the Cherokee before they could travel to the
new territory. In the Cherokee language, the forced migration was called the ‘trail where
we cried.’ We know it today as the ‘Trail of Tears.’

17 Emerson to President Van Burin, n.d., quoted in Joan Gilbert, The Trail o f Tears across Missouri,
(Columbia: University o f Missouri Press, 1996), 23.
18 Quoted in Gilbert, Tears across Missouri, 37.
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John Conrad has noted that the nation’s press treated Indian removal as a simple
transportation story, emphasizing details such as the name of the steamboat and its arrival
at a particular place. Examined in full context, coverage of removal was minor news,
dominated by official views, and rarely detailed of the pain of this policy.19 Indicating
that the general apathetic view of the American public persisted during the time of
removal while the government pursued its policy. Therefore the public outcry at this
tragic event never blossomed. And continued in isolated pockets and similar pattern
would occur during the 1950s as the Three Tribes were relocated by the Garrison Dam.
It has been estimated that of nearly 18,000 Cherokees rounded up by federal
troops, 1,500 died en route to the West, while an additional 2,500 died in camps for a
total of nearly 4,000. One Cherokee scholar, however, c alculated that the figure was
probably closer to 8,000 or 10,000 for the five-year period of removal 1835-1840.20
The Cherokee removal and the relocation of the Three Tribes have several
parallels. Both sought support in the court of public opinion, both were rejected. Each
tribe had maintained peaceable relations and took strides in adopting non-Indian ways
such as language, farming, and forms of government, yet were relocated to land the
federal government did not need in order to facilitate development. In Georgia it was the
expansion of the states non-Indian landowners and gold. On Fort Berthold it was land to
be flooded to facilitate the construction of dam and reservoir to develop non-Indian

19 John M. Conrad, The Newspaper Indian: Native American Identity in the Press, 1820-1890 (Urbana:
University o f Illinois Press, 1999), 91-91.

20Hoig,

Cherokee Chiefs, 175.
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agriculture and to protect downstream cities from a rampaging river. Despite these
similarities it is important to mention some of the differences.
The removal of the Cherokee was to land completely foreign to them. At least the
Three Tribes had hunted and camped on the open prairie above their river valleys.
Although the Three Tribes lost a way of life there was no loss of life as the tales of the
horrific “trail of tears” convey by surviving Cherokee migrants. Although there were
differences in the episodes, it is interesting that the pattern of forced removal initiated in
the 1830s persisted and was reapplied to the Three Tribes more than a hundred years
later.
Having sought the best deal they felt they could from the government at the time,
the Three Affiliated Tribes now faced being forced from their ancestral homes. Although
they would not suffer the loss of life as the Cherokee had, the loss of lifeways was just as
devastating for the Three Tribes. The designated ‘taking area’ of the reservoir included
175,716 acres comprising 26% of the reservation area; 154,911 acres under Indian
ownership and 20,805 acres owned by non-Indians.
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Department of the Interior surveys conducted in 1946 indicated that a majority of
the Indians intended to reside on the remnants of the reservation after the reservoir filled
up. These Indians maintained the desire to continue living off the land practicing
agriculture as they had. Seventy-five percent planned to use their new land for
agriculture or would like to if their holdings could be consolidated.

The conclusions of 21

21 US Department o f Interior, Bureau o f Indian Affairs, “Social and Economic Report on the Future o f the
Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, North Dakota,” MRBI Report no. 46 (Billings: BIA, 1948) 5. Record
Holdings, Lake Sakakawea Project.
22 MacGregor, Attitude, 37-39.
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MacGregor’s 1946 survey indicated that the dreams, although flooded, of the Tribes
persisted in that their culture and identity would continue.
1. The first finding of the survey is that the great majority of the Indian
households wish to live on the reservation.
2. The second finding is that the Indian households prefer the administration and
services of the Indian agency to others. They prefer a known to an unknown
quantity.
3. The third finding is that a large majority of Indian households want to make
their living by raising beef cattle.2324
An important, yet unrealized dream of the agency and tribal members, was the
desire to continue living off the land. Land consolidation was a critical component of
this dream. Individual allotments established by the Dawes Act of 1887 between 1895
and 1929 had devolved into a multiplicity of scattered holdings, most of which proved
too small to permit agrarian enterprises required for economic stability. Take the
example of Comes Along Pink who was allotted 80 acres in 1900. (Figure 9)
By March, 1947, there were forty-seven heirs to his estate with undivided interest
in portions ranging from 11.01 acres to .06 acres. The difficulty of getting everyone to
agree on land usage prevented these lands from becoming economically solvent."4
(Figure 10) Continuation of agrarian enterprises would prove rather difficult and
hastened the shift to a cash-based economy.
Unfortunately the residual acreage of broken parcels would prove unable to
support wide scale endeavors and the economic depression of the Three Tribes would
persist for years to come.

23 Ibid., 53-54.
24 Meyer, Village Indians, 222.
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25 BIA, “Land Consolidation”, n.p.
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After the water claimed the 155,000 acres of the best land on the reservation there
remained approximately 445,000 acres. Of these 445,000 acres there would be less than
66,000 acres arable. This area was not conducive to large scale crop agriculture since the
area contained high levels of sand and was highly susceptible to erosion preventing
sustainable levels of agriculture from being developed by the Three Tribes.

(Figure 11)*27

2<>BIA, “Land Consolidatoin”, n.p.
27 Fort Berthold Agency Staff, Fort Berthold Indian Agency Report on Relocation Planning and Activities
in 1951 (New Town: The Agency, 1951) 26. Four Bears Museum.
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The winter of 1950-51 was a busy one on the Fort Berthold reservation, for during
those months more than fifty community meetings were held to discuss the general and
specific problems involved in relocation. Superintendent Quinn complained that one of
the most serious problems faced by the agency staff was the “negative attitude” of the
people toward moving out of the valley.2829
By May 20, 1953, 102 families had been completely relocated, and 70 more were
in progress.

28 BIA, “Land Consolidation”, n.p.
29 Meyer, Village Indians, 230.
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From this time on the process moved rapidly, but it was not until the end of 1954 that the
superintendent was able to say that relocation was complete.j0 (Figure 12)
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Figure 12. Indian Family Settlement Patterns, 1950-1970

In 1954, a new and insidious policy now loomed over the Three Tribes, one that
the Cherokee did not have to face - termination. Congress saw an opportunity to rid
itself of its responsibilities to the Indians of Fort Berthold. On May 3,1954, a draft
termination bill was conceived regarding Fort Berthold. The bill stated:
Purpose of this act is to provide for the termination of Federal supervision over
the trust and restricted property of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold30*

30 Ibid., 235.
31

BIA, “Social and Economic Report,” n.p.
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Reservation and of certain individual members thereof, and for a termination of
Federal services furnished such members because of their status as Indians. 32*
The Tribes, response to the draft was both unanimous and immediate in a tribal
resolution dated July 17, 1954.
Now therefore be it hereby resolved by the Tribal Business Council of the Three
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation in the state of North Dakota
that the said Comprehensive Plan, or Bill is hereby rejected. It is premature,
detrimental to the Three Affiliated Tribes well being and is both unfair and
ungracious as to the needs and requests of the Three Affiliated Tribes.3j
Fortunately for the Three Tribes the pressure to terminate the relationship with the
federal government was not pursued with the same zeal that Jackson displayed desiring
removal of the Cherokees. Nonetheless, it cast a shadow upon the people as their trust in
federal agencies was strained.
The Fort Berthold agent did not fully support the Tribal Business Council’s
response to Congress. “The relocation of the people of the Fort Berthold Reservation is
not simply the physical movements of a community from one location to another,” stated
agency Superintendent Rex W. Quinn. “It is an opportunity to rehabilitate Indian people
with the assistance and guidance of the Indian Service,” he continued, “The basic
principles as I interpret them is to assist and activate a cultural change of a whole group
of people from an old, well established system to a broader American way of living and
conduct.”34 The 1820s idea of assimilation into the greater society continued to persist in

32 Fort Berthold Agency News Bulletin, July 20, 1954. n.p.
JJ Fort Berthold Agency News Bulletin, July 29, 1954, n.p.
34 Agency Staff, Report on Relocation, 1.
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the middle of the twentieth century. Those who were charged to protect and uphold
Indian rights fell in line with the policy makers of the day.
The Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara people climbed from out of the valley towards
underdeveloped uplands. They left behind their trees, their wild fruits, their coal
deposits, and their ceremonial houses, their churches and sacred place.35 Unsuccessful at
persuading the Three Tribes to accept termination formally, the BIA implemented it
administratively. Viewing relocation as a “splendid opportunity” to eliminate
“wardship,” the Bureau declined to replace much of the reservation infrastructure and
withdrew some agency programs and services.
Quinn derided the impoverished state of the reservation and generally
disapproved of many cultural practices, for instance, the practice of the ‘give away’
declaring it detrimental to the well being of tribal members.36 He at least recognized the
gravity of the situation as relocation ensued during 1951.
The emotional strain that has engulfed the reservation during the period of
relocation has brought on a confusing array of problems. The disappearance of
wild game and fruit, sources of timber supply, and the many natural bounties of
the valley will change the economy from one historically dependent on natural
resources to one of largely cash.37
There were about three hundred households on the reservation that had to be
moved including houses, fences, and all other types of improvements. These families had
lived in close knit communities with a familiar set of social and economic situations.
They were called upon to move into undeveloped areas of the reservation not normally

35 Ben Reifel, “Relocation on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation: Problems and Progress,” microfilm
PhD. Diss., Harvard University, 1952, 17. E.B. Robinson Dept, o f Special Collections, Chester-Fritz
Library, University o f North Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota.
36 Ibid.
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homesite to them.3738 Unlike the Cherokee who were moved to a completely alien
landscape, the Tribes at least were not totally unfamiliar with the rangelands having at
hunted game upon them.
The effects of the relocation created many obstacles for the Tribes and the
agencies charged with their care. “Inundation of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation by
the Garrison Reservoir presents several problems governing the providing of medical
care to the Indian population,” stated Edwin A. Shelby, MD, the senior Assistant Surgeon
on the reservation. “With the reservation isolated into five separate segments it is no
longer possible to operate a central medical center which could adequately serve the
medical needs of the people.”39 Unlike the Cherokee who at least were able to move into
a single area, the Three Tribes were required to reorganize their communities in the
newly created five geographically, non-contiguous and separated segments (Figure 4).
“It was like trying to continue a chess game after a child nonchalantly decided to
scramble the chess pieces on the board,” declared Ralph M. Shane, director of road
reconstruction.40
Just as hostility between the Ross and Ridge-Boudinot factions divided the
Cherokee nation, so too did division occur between members of the Three Tribes.
Fortunately, the gory violence and lawlessness among the Cherokee that went unabated
during the 1840s failed to materialize during the 1950s. Although there were no violent

37 Ibid., 2.
38 Ibid., 2.
39 Ibid., 2.
40 Ralph M. Shane, “A Short History o f Fort Berthold Indian Reservation” North Dakota History 26 (Fall
1959) 126.
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episodes or assassinations on the Fort Berthold Reservation like those of Ridge and
Boudinot, the war of words resonated amongst Council proceedings regarding everything
from use of money, per capita payments, and elections.
The massive changeover in the lives of tribal members was not accomplished
without generating antagonisms or arousing hostility within the populations.
Factionalism among the people of Fort Berthold, evident before the Garrison project was
ever broached, became pronounced during the period of transition. A clash over the
distribution of the additional funds to aid in the relocation and rebuilding voted by
Congress in 1949 threatened to shatter tribal organization and social unity that had
developed during their long period of tribal association on the upper Missouri.
An example of the internal strife wrought by the relocation upon the Three Tribes
regarded elections. “The Indians of the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota, were
deprived of their Democratic right to vote on September 7th, 1954,” wrote Carl Whitman
to President Eisenhower, the Attorney General and others.41 In essence, he accused
Martin Cross, the newly elected Chairman, of voting fraud and refused to recognize his
election and that of other council members.
If Martin Cross or any of his Comrades, who are trying to identify themselves as
Tribal Business Council members, are allowed to act in our names, we, members
of the Three Affiliated Tribes have a right to sue the Government of the United
States, if the Government involves any of our resources in agreement with such
“Council,” since the Government of the United States cannot claim to have acted
in ignorance either.42

41 Fort Berthold Agency News Bulletin, September 21, 1954, n.p.
42 Ibid.
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Martin Cross declared that the sole purpose of Whitman’s letter was to create
disunity and confusion among the people and further asserted that the charges were
unwarranted.
I deny the accusation. The Council, as a constituted authority, delayed the dates
of the Tribal Council elections because of very good and valid. Upon advice from
both the Tribal Attorney and the Area Office Counsel they urged legalization of
voting distract first so that true representation on the Council could be effected.43
This war of words permeated the Agency Bulletin, fortunately, it was regarded as
politics as usual and the Three Tribes were able to get on about the business of rebuilding
their communities.
As a result of the Garrison Dm project, the Three Tribes were forced to leave their
reservation homes along the Missouri River and relocate to higher ground. Relocation of
the people was difficult. They were moved in an unorganized, jumbled fashion and many
of the families were moved to locations that they called “coyote country,” meaning that
the land was unfit for farming and growing vegetables or berries.44*
The words of the people themselves can best exemplify the effects of their forced
relocation.
He [the US government] has taken away our lands and our houses. He has
relocated our churches, schools and the agency. He has flooded our lands and our
homes. We have not benefited from the Garrison Dam. There was an abundance
of fruit, cherries, and plums, now there are none. We no longer can visit with our
relatives. There are many miles to travel to reach their homes. It takes a whole
day. Lucy Rogers, Hidatsa4i

43 Ibid.
44 United Tribes o f North Dakota Development Corporation, Indian Country: Histories o f the Five
Northern Plains Tribes (Bismarck: The Corporation, 1975), 16.
45

Ibid., 17.
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It took the heart out of the Fort Berthold Reservation. The Garrison Dam called
for relocation of our Indian people onto higher ground. They were moved lock,
stock and barrel by white contractors. The contractors took advantage of the
people. For instance, the well drillers dug wells for the Indian families that were
deeper than necessary, because they were being paid by the foot. Housemovers
did not care how they moved a house and were careless about putting basements
in. It is a sad affair. Money cannot repay what we have lost.
Flora (Whitman) Demoray, Mandan4b
Our shelter is gone, the trees and fruits are gone. In the bottomland we had soft
water, up here we have hard water; it will eat a tin can in weeks time. It is a lot
more difficult to live these days. The way of life is upset. There are no ^jobs. We
have no cattie or horses. Our homes are not good. Ben Heart, Ankara4647
Robert Bennett of the Aberdeen BIA office and placement officer said, “the lands
taken on the Fort Berthold Reservation for Garrison Dam involve directly a
comparatively small number of people but their taking affects the lives of all people on
the reservation.”48 It was clear to him that the remaining land would be insufficient to
support the people with a decent standard of living.
Financial problems plagued the Tribes as credit for cash and cattle ceased in the
midst of relocation. A 1953 report completed by A.M. Cooper, BIA area director,
indicated that delinquent loans for cash had risen from $41,279.41 as of September 30 to
$77,735.17 as of December 31, 1953. In view of the above situation, plans to approve
additional applications for cash or cattle were suspended for an indefinite period.49 A
letter from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs Emmons re-confirmed the suspension of

46 Quoted in Ibid.
47 Quoted in Ibid.
48 Bismarck Tribune, 24 Oct 1951.
49 Fort Berthold Agency News Bulletin, 26 February 1954.
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credit activities “because of the high delinquency rate and the unsatisfactory condition of
loans.”50
Without credit or cash the Three Tribes faced many daunting obstacles to
realizing their dream of rebuilding their agrarian economy. Previously, they had grazed
cattle in the well-sheltered bottomlands without any outlay of money for improvements.
Approximately ninety-six percent of all timber and forestry lands heretofore utilized by
the Three Tribes were now inundated by the Garrison Dam. After the inundation there
was little timber in the residual segments and only a limited supply of timber for fence
post and fuel. They could no longer go to the timber for house logs or posts because the
timber was being inundated. The wild fruits were nearly gone and the abundant game
driven out because it had no cover. The livestock would require corrals, feed lots, and
bams to replace the natural cover of the timber.51 How did the government expect the
Three Tribes to accomplish this given the discontinuation of credit and cash?
J.B. Smith, Sr., a tribal member conveyed his frustrations, “Perhaps the Federal
Government is authorized to exercise plundering in the national interest. It can be safely
said that the Indians have done most of the giving and the United States most of the
taking.”52 The point is that from the period of Cherokee removal to the relocation of the
Three Tribes during the 1950s, a period of 120 years, little was learned and US

50 Ibid.
51 Harold W. Case, 100 Years at Ft. Berthold: The History o f Fort Berthold Indian Mission. 1876-1976,
(Bismarck: Bismarck Tribune, 1977), 509-510; Statements o f O.J. Johnson, Range Conservationist found in
Agency Staff, Report on Relocation, 23-24.
32 Smith quoted in Fort Berthold Agency News Bulletin, March 1956.
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government agencies continued a pattern of dispossessing Indian tribes, though with new
reasons and tools.
The Garrison Dam and Cherokees removal disrupted a chosen path of limited
assimilation by the Cherokees and the Three Tribes and forced cultural changes. With
one sweeping stroke, the government removed every single material vestige of the habitat
of a sovereign people. The Three Tribes, like the Cherokees, were tom from everything
they and their forefathers knew and cherished.
The Three Tribes were being pulled root and branch from an ancient setting
where an ecological balance had been worked out over generations. They were left to
make their way in a less favorable environment; this disruption of their dreams and way
of life need not leave them without opportunities for a fruitful future. Their relocation
from their valley homes served as the final chapter of a long history of continuous living
on the banks of the upper Missouri River by the Arikara, Hidatsa, and Mandan Indians.
Secretary of the Interior Oscar L. Chapman having heard of their formal acceptance of
the provision of Public Law 437 released the following statement in 1950.
All of us here recognize what it means for the Fort Berthold Indians to give up
their historic homes for the construction of Garrison Dam. They have sacrificed
much for the benefit of our citizens in that area.53
The words of John Quincy Adams in his first annual Congressional address on
December 6, 1825 continue to ring true today: “Our Relations with the numerous tribes
of aboriginal nature of this country, scattered over its extensive surface and so dependent
even for their very existence upon our power, have been during the present year [1825]

53 Department o f the Interior Press Release dated March 16, 1950. Record Holdings, Lake Sakakawea
Project.
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highly interesting.” '4 Andrew Jackson’s words also echoed in the hearts of federal policy
makers when he said, “The States which had so long been retarded in their improvement
by the Indian tribes residing in the midst of them are at length relieved from the evil, and
this unhappy race.”5455 The basic problem was one of two cultures in conflict.
From the standpoint of land use the relocation of the 1950s may have been more
disruptive than the other major crises in the Three Tribes’ history: the smallpox epidemic
of 1837 and the abandonment of Like-a-Fish-hook village in the 1880’s. One can argue
that the Indians were “root-bound.” Unfortunately that assumption smacks too much of
the nineteenth-century view that European American culture was manifestly superior to
that of the Indians and that the task was simply to force “the Indian” to adopt the culture
o f the dominant society. The building of the dam and its consequent destruction of the
old way of life constituted yet another example of persistent federal and state efforts to
force the native people of this continent to assimilate.
United States Indian policy is characterized by a determination to do certain
things to “the Indian” for their own good, assuming that non-Indian society, as the
inheritor of a superior civilization, knew better than the Indian what the latter’s best
interest were. Henry David Thoreau said, “If I knew for certain that a man was coming
to my house with the conscious design of doing me good, I would run for my life.”56 The
Three Tribes had no place to run.

54 President Adams’s quoted in Richardson, Vol II, 306.
55 Ibid., 294.
56 Thoreau, Walden and Other Writings (1845), 295.

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION: LEGACY OF CONTROL

Following the relocation of the Three Tribes, focus now turned towards rebuilding
the community and an economy turned upside down by the Garrison Dam. During the
1960s and 1970s the reservation continued in a state of uneasiness as a cash economy
slowly began to emerge. Like the phoenix, the Three Tribes were destined to rise from
the ashes and emerge from the flood as vibrant as they were before the Garrison Dam was
constructed.
The Three Tribes had new dreams of economic prosperity and self-sufficiency
having survived the federal government’s attempt to terminate their relationship. On
May 10, 1985, the charter to create the Garrison Unit Joint Tribal Advisory Committee
(JTAC) was signed by the Secretary of Interior Donald P. Hodel.1
The purpose of this committee was to assess the compensation provided the upperMissouri tribes, to include the Three Tribes, by the federal government when their lands
were taken for construction of the Pick-Sloan plan.
This report included findings and recommendation which undertook, as the
Garrison Diversion Unit Commission (GDUC) recommended, “to find ways to resolve

1 U.S. Department o f the Interior, Bureau o f Indian Affairs, Water Resources Branch. Garrison Unit Joint
Tribal Advisory Committee, “Final Report o f the Garrison Unit Joint Tribal Advisory Committee,’'
Billings: The Bureau, May 1986. Record Holdings, Riverdale Real Esatte Office, US Army Coprs of
Engineers, Omaha District, Missouri Division, Riverdale, North Dakota. Joint Tribal Advisory Committee
(JTAC) records, 1986-present.
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inequities” borne by the tribes.2 Based upon GDUC recommendations the JTAC made
the following conclusion:
1. Development of irrigation on remaining Tribal lands would reduce the Three
Tribes loss of their economic base and good farmlands. The study
concluded that up to 107,000 acres could be developed for agriculture on Fort
Berthold.
2. The Three Tribes should be permitted to develop docks, campgrounds, resorts,
picnic areas, etc. along the lakeshore as part of Tribal economic enterprise.
The former Indian lands comprising the represent excess lands and the
shorelines should be restored to the tribes.
3. The tribe’s right to water will be protected in a significant and beneficial
manner by utilizing water on the irrigation project and municipal, industrial
and rural system described in the report. The quantification of other users
should be carried out in cooperation with the tribe.
4. The tribes are entitled to the replacement of infrastructure destroyed by
Federal action.. .a bridge for access between the communities and central
facilities and adequate secondary access roads.
5. Preferential rights to electrical power not to exceed 10 MWH.
6. The tribes clearly were not compensated in an amount calculated by a
methodology that accounted for the unique circumstances and values taken
from the tribe. The Committee received testimony from two economic
experts who utilized methodologies designed to account for those unique
circumstance and values. Utilizing both formulas for the Fort Berthold
Reservation results in compensation due between $178.4 million and 411.8
million.3
Congressional response to the recommendations of the JTAC would culminate in
the passage of the Equitable Compensation Act in 1992 in which the Three Tribes were
promised 36,000 acres of land to be returned and the sum of $149.2 million. However,
despite these findings the Three Tribes still faced an uncertainty remained for these
dreams to be realized.

2 Joint Tribal Advisory Committee (JTAC), “Final Report to the Secretary o f the Interior,” (Washington,
D.C.: Dept, o f the Interior, December 20, 1984). Four Bears Museum.
3 JTAC, “Final Report,” 6-8.
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In the JTAC’s final report, the detailed costs analyses of irrigating 107,000 acres
ot reservation land seemed insurmountable. Construction costs were estimated to exceed
SI33 million 1986 dollars. To date, less than 4,000 acres of land are irrigated.45
Of the thirty-three recreation sites along Lake Sakakawea, only eleven fell within
the boundaries of the Fort Berthold reservation and the Corps managed seven of those.
Of the four sites managed by the tribes, only the Four Bears recreation area has
significant development. The dream of expanded recreation and tourism to North
Dakota is another dream unrealized.
At the time of the JTAC’s final report, neither the state of North Dakota nor the
Three Tribes had pressed for quantification of the reserved water rights under the Winters
doctrine. Accordingly the Three Tribes have expressed no desire to identify or quantify
their water rights.3 Were they to do so, some estimates conclude that they would possess
rights to all waters within the Garrison reservoir, something the states would certainly not
embrace.
The Three Tribes want a bridge near Highway 8 across Lake Sakakawea to
provide quicker egress to the agency at New Town. The North Dakota State Highway
Department has estimated the cost of building a bridge across Lake Sakakawea to be
about $60 million.6
The culture of the Three Tribes depended upon village life and agriculture. Their
economic lives, as well as their social lives, were structured around the use of the only

4 Ibid., 16.
5 Ibid., 19.
6 Ibid., 26.
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remaining bottomlands of their reservation for ranching and farming pursuits. Reports of
the MRBI documented that the Three Tribes, by the 1940s, were economically selfsufficient. The bottomlands of the Missouri basin had served them for a hundred years
and were characterized in these reports as a “natural factory,” or “a productive engine,”
that provided for all the economic and subsistence needs of tribal members.7
Congress recognized that the bottomlands represented a significant portion of the
economic prosperity of the Three Tribes. Section 6 of the War Department’s Civil
Appropriations Act of 1947, known as the Indian Limitation Clause, prohibited the
construction of the Garrison Dam until suitable replacement, or lieu lands were found by
the War Department and offered to the Interior Department for the Three Tribes. The
inability of the War Department to offer suitable lands in lieu of the lands lost was
identified by the JTAC as a severe failing.
Ultimately, however, Congress failed to pay the Three Tribes just compensation
that permitted them to replace the lost land base of 155,000 acres. The $12.5 million
settlement was offered to the tribes as a “take it or leave it” proposition. The following
table assesses the income associated with the Tribe’s taken lands.
Table 5. 1986 agricultural incomes associated with the Three Tribe’s taken lands.
Activity
Irrigation
Dry Land Crops
Woodland/Pasture land

Net Returns per acre
$194.52
101.82
61.92
Totals:

No. o f acres in taken lands
30,000
4 1 ,0 6 2
84.973
156,035
capitalized at 9%

Total Annual Income
to Tribes (S 000)
$5,835.6
4,180.9
5,278.5
$15,278.0
$169,756.0

7 Ibid., 30. See the MRBI reports produced from 1947 to 1972 for additional description o f Fort Berthold’s
self-sufficiency and the river environment. U.S Department o f the Interior, Bureau o f Indian Affairs,
Reports o f Missouri River Basin Investigations Project, 1947-1972. Missouri River Basin Investigations
Project (Billings: BIA, 1947-1973). Record Holdings, Lake Sakakawea Project.

8Ibid., 35.
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The idea that the Three Tribes deserved equitable compensation was further
attested to by the testimony of Dr. H. Paul Friesma’s report on the social and economic
impacts of the Three Affiliated Tribes attributable to the Garrison Dam. The adverse
effect of the Garrison Dam on the Three Tribes’ existence w as clear and beyond
reasonable dispute. Dr. Friesma’s report further reinforced the JTAC’s conclusion that,
prior to the taking act of 1949, the Three Tribes were a self-sufficient and well-integrated
society. The JTAC concluded that the original compensation amount of $12.5 million
was inadequate to permit the Three Tribes to rebuild their economic base.910
Congressional action was required to remedy the situation and provide just compensation
for the wrongs done the Three Tribes.
Six years after the JTAC’s final report in 1986, Senator Kent Conrad of North
Dakota introduced the bill that would eventually became the Three Affiliated Tribes
Equitable Compensation Act of 1992, Public Law 102-575. Nearly fifty-years after their
lands were taken, the Three Tribes were provided $149.2 million and promised the return
o f 46,800 acres.,0 The funds were placed in trust while the interest was to be made
available to the Three Tribes to support for tribal needs and continued economic
development.
On February 4, 1993, Tribal Chairman Wilbur D. Wilkinson delivered the State of
the Reservation address entitled; “There will be a better Tomorrow.” In it he declared:

9 Ibid., 36.
10 Although the JTAC called for just compensation the B1A strenuously opposed the idea and more research
is needed to explore their rationale.
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Today, I see a new age of prosperity ahead for our people which will make us a
self-sufficient, stand-alone government utilizing its greatest resources; the land
and the people.11
Having sought compensation for over fifty years the Three Tribes were now
realizing some of their dreams as Chairman Wilkinson’s statements in 1993 attest.
Already the Three Tribes were benefiting from PL 102-575 with the return of 5,800 acres
of land to tribal ownership and an additional 41,000 acres pending.
He touted many of the positive developments that had occurred on the reservation
to improve quality of life for tribal members. From construction of the Fort Berthold
Community College, expansion of Northrop’s aircraft manufacturing facilities to the
investment of $400,000 in making the raising of bison an economic reality.112 The Three
Tribes are showing signs of economic recovery and realization of their dream of a selfsufficient and prosperous nation.
But all the rebuilding is yet to be completed. “In closing,” said Chairman
Wilkinson; “I feel that there is great potential for us. It is up to us, working together in
unity, to see our potential, our opportunities as things that can become real for us, and act
on these points. I see a new propensity ahead for the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Ankara
people. We have the people, we have the resources, we created the opportunities, and we
will realize the benefits. It is only a matter of time.” 13 The Three Tribes have come full
circle and may yet realize their dreams that were once flooded by the harnessing of the

11 Wilbur D. Wilkinson, “There will be a Better Tomorrow,” State o f the Reserv ation address, 4 February
1993 Missouri River Diversion Project Collection, North Dakota Institute for Regional Studies. North
Dakota State University, Fargo, North Dakota.

12 Ibid., 3-11.
13 Ibid., 15.
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mighty Missouri and like the Cherokee, successful in their new situation, they adapted
after all.
Prior to the Garrison Dam the Three Tribes had maintained their subsistence
lifeways for hundreds of years. When the first French traders entered the region in the
mid-1700s they encountered a series of villages and a people with a rich agrarian
heritage. The Three Tribes were more than just living off the land, they were thriving as
traders amongst other plains tribes and the newly arrived Europeans promised even
greater prosperity. Their hopes for continued growth were to be dashed by changes that
were thrust upon them by an expanding nation and increased contact with non-Indians.
The Three Tribes at the time of the Garrison Dam were still agriculturists and the
environment in which they thrived, the Missouri River bottom was provided more than
just subsistence levels of crops, the future of an agrarian economy appeared bright.
Tribal members utilized the region’s resources extensively being careful to not cver-use
the land, but then the waters came.
"My memories of the garden down where we lived in the valley there, before the
dam, everything grew very well,” recalled Martin Cross, Tribal Chairman in the 1940s
and 1950s. "We raised beans, com, squash that we would harv est so that we could eat it
during the winter," he continued, “after the dam my Dad had a garden and there was no
comparison, the ground was hard and when the potatoes would grow, they would be just
around the roots, maybe two or three little ones. The ground was hard, it was prairie.”14
The lifeways had changed and gone forever w'ere the fertile lands of the Missouri River.

14 Transcript o f the interview o f Martin Cross by Mike Schatz, New Town, N.Dak. 23 June 1999. Oral
History Collections, State Historical Society o f North Dakota, Bismarck.
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Phyllis Old Dog Cross, who was fifteen at the time of the Garrison Dam
construction tells how her Dad, prior to the dam, was a farmer and rancher near the
community of Parshall. “We had normal things you do on a farm, a garden, cows,
chickens, the kids all had horses. After the flood [construction of the Garrison Dam no
more horses, no more chickens, no more nothing.”1' The communities in which the
Three Tribes had thrived were strained by the loss of land and ways of living many had
known recalled Phyllis, “So 1 think the total way of life was wiped out, and we all had to
kind of figure out what it is that, what the new way was going to be.” 156
Where once families would go out and gather berries, now the berries were even
harder to find, if anyone was even looking. “Well, the trees, the wi ld berries now are
harder to find, if you can find them. That used to be normal activity of all families, now I
don’t see anyone picking wild berries anymore.”17 The Three Tribes had adapted nonIndian ways out of necessity, they had moved to cash-based economy and many tribal
members sought work in factories such as Northrop or in convenience stores. No longer
would they hunt deer or pick berries or plant gardens. Many who remember these days
convey the sadness of lost lifeways, “I miss my horses so much it just still brings tears to
my eyes, it just seemed so unfair to be treated that way.”18
As a teenager during the relocation of her family from Elbowoods to Parshall,
Marilyn Hudson explained how this new' generation, since the dam, seemed un-connected

15 Transcript o f the interview o f Phyllis Old Dog Cross by Patti Schatz, Parshall, N.Dak. 23 June 1999. n.p.
Oral History Collections, State Historical Society o f North Dakota, Bismarck.
“ Ibid.
,7 Ibid
IK

Ibid.

105

to the loss and the communities under water, “I wonder if people realize that at one time
there were thriving communities under the water [Lake Sakakawea]."10 In 1955,
although the relocation to Parshall was abrupt, she recounts how the Three Tribes faced
these changes, “New challenges, new directions, working.. .it’s hard to really.. .people
didn’t just sit and think about what happened. They kept on with life-probably harder
then ever, you know, to readjust, start over again so it was a very busy time.’’1920
The forced changes to the lifeways of the Three Tribes didn’t mean the
elimination or complete assimilation of the Three Tribes. They have certainly adapted
well and now with the increased resources 01 the JTAC and the Equitable Compensation
Act, they have additional means by which to ensure that their culture remains an integral
part of what makes America the special place it is. We can not erase the past, nor can we
ignore it. We can, however, look to the Three Tribes as an example of how flooded
lifeways can precipitate social change and how a culture can survive in any environment.
As Chairman Wilkinson’s 1993 state of the reservation attests, there will be a better
tomorrow.

19 Transcript o f the interview o f Marilyn C. Hudson interviewed by Larry Volk, Parshall, N.Dak. 23 June
1999, n.p. Oral History Collections, State Historical Society o f North Dakota, Bismarck.

20Ibid.
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APPENDIX A: EPILOGUE
They will tame you, Old Missouri,
Guide your urge to reach the sea.
Build a wall to spread your waters
Over woodland, field, and lea.
Then will yoke you, Old Missouri,
To their whirring dynamoSweep the shadows from the prairies
With the power of your flow.
Man has tossed a butte and hilltop
Across your current wild and free.
Nevermore will Old Missouri
Flow unfettered to the sea.
(H.R. Martinson, Bismarck, 1951)1

THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES

' Back cover o f North Dakota Outdoors, Aug 1951.
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF SUPREME COURT WATER CASES
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908)
Skeen v. United States, 273 F.2d. 93 (9th Cir. 1921)
United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939)
United States v. Walker River Irrigation District, 104 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1939)
United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation District, 236 F.2d 321 (9lh Cir. 1956), cert.
Denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957)
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)
United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 521 (1971)
United States v. District Court for Water Div. 5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971)
United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974)
United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10lh. Cir 1974)
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976)
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978)
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983)
Nevada V. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983)
United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983)
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983)
Oregon v. United States, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984)
Wyoming v. United States. 492 U.S. 406 (1989)
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992)
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APPENDIX C: LIST OF TERMS
Acre-Foot - the amount of water required to cover one acre to a depth of one foot. An
acre-foot equals 326,851 gallons or 43,560 cubic feet. This volume measurement is used
to describe a quantity of storage in a reservoir
Appropriation, Doctrine of Prior - with respect to water, refers to the system western
states use to assign and distribute quantifiable amounts of ware, in the form of water
rights; system operates on a first-in-time, first-in-rights basis.
Dam - any barrier which impounds or diverts water
Drainage Area - the amount of area drained by a river system to include all tributaries
and associated streams
Earthen (or earthfiil) dam - an embankment dam in which more than 50% of the total
column is formed of compacted fine-grained material. These are the most common type
of dams because their construction involves using materials in the natural state, requiring
little processing
Embankment - fill material, usually earth or rock, placed with sloping sides and usually
with length greater than height. All dams are types of embankments
Flood - the inundation of a normally dry area caused by high flow, or overflow of water
in an established watercourse (such as a river, stream, or drainage ditch), or ponding of
water at or near the point where rain fell
Flood Control - reducing the risk by building dams and/or embankments and/or altering
the river channel
Floodplain - the land area of a river valley that becomes inundated with water during a
flood
Hydroelectric Generation - the production of electric power throug8h the use of the
gravitational force of falling water
Impoundment - a body of water gathered and enclosed (such as in a reservoir) for
economic and other water-supply need0
Irrigation - the controlled application of water to arable lands to supply water
requirements not satisfied by rainfall
Kilowatt-Hour (kWh) - a basic unit of electrical energy which equals one kilowatt of
power use for one hour
Mainstem - the principal river in a basin, as opposed to the tributary streams and smaller
rivers that feed into it
Mitigation - measures taken to offset, or compensate for, damage to natural systems
caused by a particular project or human activity
Quantification - defining the amount and timing of a water right
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Reservoir - a manmade facility, often behind a dam or other obstruction, for the storage,
regulation, and controlled release of water
Riparian - pertaining to a river (e.g. the riparian zone)
Riparian Zone - the habitat found on stream banks and river banks, where semi-aquatic
and terrestrial organisms mingle
River - a natural stream of water emptying into an ocean, lake, or another river
River Basin - drainage area of a river and its tributaries
Taking - refers to the transfer of dominion or control of property from a private owner to
the government against his or her consent
Tributary - a stream or river that flows into another stream or river and contributes
water to it
Water Rights - priority claim to water. A legal right to use a specific amount of water
from a natural or artificial body of surface water for general or specific purposes such as
irrigation, mining, power, domestic use, or instream flow
Watercourse - a natural stream channel that, depending on the season, may or may not
contain water
Winters Doctrine - a legal document arising from the case of Winters v. U.S., US
Supreme Court, 1908, 207 US 564, that holds that, upon the creation of a federal
reservation on the public domain, the reservation has appurtenant to it the right to divert
as much water from streams within or bordering it as is necessary to serve the purposes
for which the reservation was created

Source: American Rivers staff, http://www.amrivers.org.glossary.html accessed on
4/25/00
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